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ABSTRACT 
This thesis seeks to examine the way key international actors (U.S.-E.U.) and the 
Kemalists have shaped and currently influence Turkey’s attitude toward its Kurdish 
minority. The tough negotiations on Turkey’s accession to the E.U. since 2005, and the 
de facto establishment of an autonomous Kurdish entity in northern Iraq following the 
2003 U.S. military intervention, have brought the Kurds’ plight into the limelight. These 
developments have involved the United States and the E.U. in the management of 
Turkey’s Kurdish question to an unprecedented extent. The research demonstrates that 
Turkey’s concessions to the Kurds in the 2000s have been moderate and that Ankara is 
still reluctant to recognize the existence of a Kurdish minority that deserves special 
rights. The research also reveals that, despite U.S. rhetoric concerning human rights and 
the treatment of the Kurds, the United States, in line with the rationalists’ approach, 
keeps viewing Turkish-U.S. strategic partnership as vital to America’s interests. The 
E.U.’s socialization strategy seeks to reform Turkey’s human rights regime, as the 
Europeans have reached the conclusion that Turkey’s Kurdish question is an issue of 
denied cultural rights, as opposed to an issue of forced assimilation. 
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The question of how key actors of the international community (U.S.-E.U.) and 
elements of the Turkish bureaucracy (Army-Kemalists) have shaped and currently 
influence Turkey’s attitude toward its Kurdish minority has preoccupied the academic 
community since the 1980s. Important developments in Turkey and the Middle East, such 
as the launching of the campaign of Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) against the Turkish 
state in 1984 and the dramatic capture of its leader in 1999, tough negotiations on 
Turkey’s accession to the E.U. since 2005, and the de facto establishment of an 
autonomous Kurdish entity in northern Iraq following the 2003 U.S. military 
intervention, have brought the Kurds’ recurring plight into the limelight. These 
developments have involved the United States and the E.U. in the management of the 
Kurdish question, particularly in Turkey, to an unprecedented extent. 
What role does the international community have in domestic Turkish politics? 
The question is of interest to policymakers and theorists alike. Policymakers are 
interested in identifying the impact of their efforts on specific policies, and theorists have 
long debated the relative weight of domestic or international variables in domestic policy. 
This thesis seeks to address these questions through an analysis of the interaction 
between the international community, the Turkish bureaucracy, and Turkish policy 
toward the Kurds.  
The United States’ focus on the fate of the Kurds in Turkey has fluctuated 
depending on broader political factors. Primary sources, such as Lokman I. Meho’s 
Documentary Sourcebook on Congressional records and the State Department’s 
correspondence regarding the role of the Kurds in the Middle East, reveal that the United 
States has been involved in Kurdish affairs since the 1940s. Until the late 1980s, the 
Americans viewed Kurdish nationalism in Turkey through a Cold War lens. They 
suspected that the Soviets had the ability to manipulate the Kurdish communities and 




context, the U.S. viewed Turkey as a frontline state whose integrity and stability had to 
be preserved. Turkey’s forced assimilation of the Kurds and its denial of their cultural 
rights were not on the White House’s agenda. 
However, in the 1990s, Washington’s policies changed. The Clinton 
administration’ s rhetoric regarding human rights and the protection of minorities, as well 
as the U.S. Congress’s growing criticism of Turkey’s Kurdish policies, made Turkey 
understand that ignoring the Americans’ human rights concerns was no longer an option. 
The Turks concluded that some reforms were necessary in order to convince their allies 
that the country’s democratic polity guaranteed equal civic rights to all its citizens.  
Research reveals that the United States never stopped considering the territorial 
integrity of Turkey as key to Middle Eastern stability. The Americans were careful to 
suggest moderate reforms that would “recognize” the cultural rights of the Kurds without 
undermining Turkey’s Kemalist legacy, and actively contributed to the fight against the 
PKK’s terrorist threat through intelligence sharing and material assistance; the U.S. is 
also alleged to have contributed to Ocalan’s capture. The United States labeled the PKK 
as a terrorist organization much earlier that the Europeans, while the Marxist-Leninist 
ideology of the group had already placed the group in the anti-western camp.  In any 
case, the general U.S. policy toward Turkey has been supportive; its pressure on Turkey 
on the human rights front has been less aggressive when compared with the respective 
policy of the E.U. 
This thesis argues that the U.S. stance vis-à-vis the Kurdish question in Turkey 
has been primarily dictated by the needs of U.S. policy regarding the wider Middle East. 
Turkey’s geo-strategic location has been central to the planning and support of important 
U.S. operations in the Middle East both before and after the end of the Cold War. 
However, the U.S. need to maintain a strong working relationship with Ankara does not 
mean that the Americans are indifferent to internal developments in southeastern 
Anatolia. On the contrary, the pacification of Turkey’s Kurdish region is important to 
U.S. interests, in the sense that it will eliminate a serious source of instability within 
Turkey, curb support to the PKK’s campaign by the Kurdish community in southeastern  
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Turkey, safeguard essential energy routes for the West which cross Kurdish-populated 
areas in Anatolia, and enable the United States to focus its attention to other fronts in the 
Middle East.  
Europe has failed so far to articulate an unambiguous strategy toward Turkey. 
Although E.U.-Turkish negotiations regarding Turkey’s full membership into the 
European structures have been underway since 2005, key European countries, including 
France and Germany, keep stressing that a relationship of “privileged partners” would be 
more appropriate. The E.U. has not yet made a decision whether Turkey should be 
considered a strategic partner or not. Nevertheless, the political and economic stability in 
Turkey are valued by Europe as significant to its own politico-economic security. Thus, a 
basic element of Europe’s strategy is to anchor Turkey to Europe, even if not as a full 
member.  
In that context, Turkey’s poor human rights record and the shortcomings of its 
legal system have come under serious scrutiny by the European establishment. However, 
the present research reveals that the Kurdish question is not viewed by the E.U. as an 
issue of denied minority rights and forced assimilation; on the contrary, it is approached 
as an issue of human rights abuses by Turkey’s quasi-democratic political culture. 
In general, the author of this thesis argues that the size of the Turkish economy, 
the undeniable geo-strategic importance of Turkey’s location in conjunction with the 
growing engagement of the U.S. in the Middle East, and prospects of lucrative arms deals 
to meet the needs of the Turkish army mean that neither Europe or the United States can 
afford to marginalize Turkey solely on the grounds of its poor human rights record and 
the repression of its Kurdish community. 
As far as the proponents of Turkey’s official ideology, Kemalism, are concerned, 
the research reveals that, since the 1920s, the Kemalists sought to transform the Turkish 
society along European lines. Scholars such as Michael Gunter, David McDowall, Kevin 
McKiernan, Robert Olson, and Martin Van Bruinessen have extensively written about the 
Turkish establishment’s unitary policies which allowed neither the recognition of the 
society’s multiethnic character nor the attachment to “backward” Islamic values.  
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The Kemalists’ decision to deny special minority privileges to the Kurds was 
taken sometime in 1923. Surprisingly, in the time frame between 1920 and1922, Kemal 
Ataturk’s administration had explored the possibility of granting the status of limited 
autonomy to Turkey’s Kurdish provinces. Indeed, in 1922, the Turkish Grand National 
Assembly (GNA) had discussed a draft plan which provided for the election of a Kurdish 
National Assembly by universal suffrage. The official language of the autonomous entity 
was expected to be Turkish; however, the use of the Kurdish language was encouraged.1 
The Turkish establishment backed out when it became apparent that the proposed 
administrative plan could lead to further territorial losses for Turkey in the future.  
After the “Sevres syndrome” had dictated the decision to eliminate Kurdish 
nationalism, the state remained focused on that central principle of Kemalism, 
irrespective of the nature of the governing coalitions. Moreover, after the 1980 coup, the 
army proclaimed itself the guardian of Kemal’s legacy and rejected all plans regarding 
concessions to the Kurdish community. 
The various phases of Kurdish history, as discussed in the chapters to follow, 
leads to the conclusion that the fate of Kurdistan throughout the centuries has been 
shaped by the imperatives of the national interests of external forces. Apart from limited 
periods of self-rule by dynasties of Kurdish origin, Kurdistan had successively been 
under the control of the Arabs, the Safavids, and the Ottomans, the latter being the most 
influential in shaping the Kurdish administrative structure. Governance in Kurdistan 
periodically changed from direct rule under foreign administrators, especially during the 
Mongol and Safavid conquests, to self-rule by the traditional notable families of 
Kurdistan with a considerable degree of autonomy in the Ottoman period. During the last 
decades of the declining Ottoman state, the challenges of the West led to the introduction 
of power-centralization policies, which in turn eliminated many of the privileges 
(administrative autonomy) enjoyed by the Kurdish principalities. 
However, during all the historical periods and under all conquerors, the 
tendencies toward self-governance and management of local affairs never ceased to arise. 
The tribal organization of Kurdistan since the pre-Islamic period, based on the authority 
                                                 
1 David McDowall, A Modern History of the Kurds (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1996), 189. 
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of local chieftains, and the sense of otherness always led to revolts or political alliances 
that sought to preserve the notables’ status quo. Indeed, Kurdish notables used to pledge 
allegiance to the Ottomans or the Safavids, or switch their loyalties accordingly, on the 
grounds of material gains and promises of authority on local affairs. The Kurdish 
notables were also instrumental in the emergence of Kurdish nationalism when the 
disintegration of the Ottoman Empire became inevitable.  
This thesis asserts that the early Kurdish nationalist movement of the late 19th 
century was influenced by other nationalist movements of that time period such as those 
of the Balkan countries. However, the Islamic bond between the Kurds and the Ottomans, 
absent in the Balkan cases, should not be downplayed. On the contrary, it was this 
religious bond, along with long-lasting rivalries between the leading Kurdish families that 
fragmented the Kurdish nationalist movement.  
It is hard to argue whether Kurdish nationalism was fueled by pure nationalist 
idealism or by the desire to preserve the old tradition of self-rule, even under the 
supervision of an external actor. The line between these two arguments seems blurred. 
However, it may be argued that the old tribal organization of the Kurds cultivated diverse 
political loyalties and orientations and, subsequently, strong rivalries between Kurdish 
families, which undermined the chance of establishing a unified leadership and promote 
the Kurdish agenda. When a movement is unable to speak with one voice, it is easier to 
suppress it, and that is the Kurds’ case. 
A. THEORETICAL CONTEXT: HOW INTERNATIONAL ACTORS 
INFLUENCE DOMESTIC ARRANGEMENTS 
Before discussing the policies of the Kemalists, Americans, and Europeans vis-à-
vis the Kurdish question in Turkey, it is necessary to examine the theoretical framework 
under which international actors may influence domestic political arrangements in a 
sovereign state. There has been a long-lasting debate among scholars of political science 




1.  Social Constructivism 
Advocates of social constructivism, such as Martha Finnemore, Kathryn Sikkink, 
Emanuel Alder, Thomas Risse, Stephen Ropp, and Jeffrey Checkel, argue that states 
participate in networks of transnational social relations that shape their understanding of 
the world and their role in it.2 Socialization is a process of introducing newcomers to the 
norms and rules governing a specific community or social group.3 States are socialized 
by international actors, such as international organizations, to re-define their interests, 
and to accept new political goals and values which have considerable impact on the 
structure of the states themselves. Their interests are shaped by internationally held 
norms and understandings about what is appropriate or inappropriate. The new rules are 
taken for granted because they are understood as “normal.”4 International actors have the 
power to “create” interests, change states’ preferences, and teach their decision-makers. 
This normative context affects the behavior of policy-makers and of public opinion, 
which may restrict the freedom of action of those policy-makers. The normative context 
can change over time, creating relevant shifts in state interests and behavior. 
The reasoning of the social constructivists’ proposition is based on the 
observation that, in most cases, states pursue goals that do not result from external 
pressures or demands by domestic groups. Instead, these goals are shaped by 
internationally-accepted norms and values. These norms create obligations that states find 
it unnatural to deviate from. A state is itself a socially constructed unit under continuous 
evolution. So, when it re-defines its interests through international socialization, its nature 
and identity change, too. Finnemore rejects the rationalists’ argument that states simply 
pursue power and wealth - the black-box approach - because these goals have no meaning 
whatsoever if they are not defined by widely-understood social values and social  
 
                                                 
2 Martha Finnemore, National Interests in International Society (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University 
Press, 1996), 2-3. 
3 Robert Lauer and Warren Handel, Social Psychology: The Theory and Application of Symbolic 
Interactionism (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1977). 
4 Jeffrey Checkel, “Going Native” in Europe? (Oslo: Arena Press, 2001). 
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interaction.5 While the rationalists would argue that different actors with different 
interests behave differently, Finnemore observes that international norms of behavior 
make different actors act in a similar manner.   
2. Rationalists 
The rationalist approach, exemplified by the thinking of neo-realists such as 
Krasner, Walt, and Waltz, suggest that state interests and preferences derive from 
objective conditions and the material characteristics of a state.6 Any change in policy vis-
à-vis the national interest is attributed to changes in these conditions and characteristics. 
In other words, the policy change is the result of pressure by domestic interest groups, 
which have been affected by changes in the material conditions in the country. In that 
sense, the primary source of state interest is found inside the state boundaries rather than 
outside. Even in cases of state security and inter-state relations, the preference for 
security is inherent in the state, and the decision-making process is independent of 
international influences. 
For neo-realists, politics remain in the domestic arena of states. Due to the 
absence of a controlling political authority in the international system, the international 
domain is the field of an eternal struggle for states to maximize their security. Whatever 
their political systems, states respond to the logic of anarchy, balancing in response to the 
changes in the distribution of material power in the international system.7 
Waltz has also talked about the socialization process of states, but he understands 
this process as the emulation of the behavior of the most successful actors in the 
international system, in order for a state to survive in its anarchic environment.8 Imitating 
the successful policies of another state is a perfectly rational strategy to adopt. For  
 
                                                 
5 Finnemore, National Interests in International Society, 5. 
6 Stephen D. Krasner, Defending the National Interest: Raw Materials Investments and U.S. Foreign 
Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978); Stephen Walt, The Origins of Alliances: Superpower 
and Regional Diplomacy in the Middle East, 1955-1979 (Berkeley: University of California, 1983); 
Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Publications, 1979). 
7 Walt, The Origins of Alliances. 
8 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 127-129. 
 8
example, John Ikenberry has documented the adoption of British and Japanese 
privatization policies by policy-makers in other governments trying to counter the fiscal 
crises in the late 1970s.9 
In general, neo-realist thinking has moved away from the concept of norm 
internalization. Schimmelfennig has argued that norms are resources or constraints to be 
manipulated by rational actors. In his words,  
both socializers and states to be socialized weight up the costs and benefits 
of socialization and internalization in light of their predefined political 
goals and decide, on this basis, whether to engage in socialization 
(socializers), or to adopt the community norms and transform them into 
domestic rules (the socializees).10 
From the rationalists’ point of view, the socialization process may only take place 
when there are benefits, such as promises of rewards for compliance with norms, or the 
threat of sanctions in response to deviations from normative standards. The actors being 
socialized agree to change their behavior to conform to international norms to the extent 
that the benefits of compliance are greater than the costs of resistance. 
3. Evaluation 
The debate between scholars of international relations theory on the influence of 
international actors on domestic policies leads to the conclusion that external influence is 
indeed possible under certain conditions. Specifically, both constructivists and 
rationalists agree that external actors can affect arrangements in the domestic realm, 
though they mention different conditions. The constructivists are much more optimistic 
about the ability of external actors, mainly in the form of international organizations, to 
socialize states and change their perceptions about national interests, create new interests, 
and teach leaders and public opinion about the external actors’ definitions of right or 
wrong. The rationalists are much more restrained, arguing that national interests are 
shaped primarily by the interaction of domestic groups. International actors can exert 
                                                 
9 G. John Ikenberry, “The International Spread of Privatization Policies, Learning and Policy 
Bandwagoning,” in The Political Economy of Public Sector Reform and Privatization, ed. Ezra N. 
Suleiman and John Waterbury (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990), 88-110. 
10 Frank Schimmelfennig, International Socialization in Europe (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2006), 3. 
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influence on domestic arrangements only if they can promise rewards for compliance 
with the internationally-held norms, or threaten sanctions for deviations from those 
norms. 
The author of this thesis asserts that the European Union has resorted to intense 
socialization with Turkey’s elites as a way to convince the Turkish government to enact 
new laws or abolish obsolete regulations that would bring the country’s human rights 
regime in line with fundamental European norms. The prospect of E.U. accession, which 
is associated with economic prosperity and membership in one of the world’s most 
influential clubs, has already triggered important reforms in Turkey and has forced the 
political-military establishment to acknowledge Turkey’s “Kurdish reality.”  
Official E.U. documents that are presented in the following chapters, including 
the Accession Partnership document of March 2001, the 2005 negotiating framework, 
and the yearly reports on Turkey’s progress since 2006, and also the rhetoric of the 
Commission’s representatives, show that the goal of E.U. socialization is by no means to 
force Turkey to recognize the right of its Kurdish community to secede or establish an 
autonomous entity; on the contrary, it seeks to persuade the Turkish establishment to 
grant basic political, linguistic, and cultural rights to the Kurds. It is worth noting that the 
E.U. does not understand the Kurdish question as an issue of forced assimilation, but 
rather as one of human rights abuses and terrorism (by the PKK). However, the power of 
E.U. socialization has its limits, for, as long as Europe fails to clarify its intentions 
regarding the prospect of full E.U. membership, Turkey becomes less receptive to 
European suggestions concerning the treatment of its Kurdish minority. 
On the other hand, the rationalist approach seems more appropriate to describe 
Turkish-U.S. relations. Until the fall of the Berlin wall, the Americans viewed Turkey’s 
political stability and territorial integrity as indispensable to the interests of the United 
States in the Middle East. As the containment of the Soviet Union took precedence over 
any other considerations, the Kurdish unrest in eastern Anatolia, led by the Marxist-
Leninist PKK, was instantly perceived as a direct threat to the integrity of allied Turkey. 
Human rights concerns were not really taken into account. 
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But even when the Clinton and Bush administrations brought human rights and 
democratic rule to the top of their agendas, Turkish-U.S. relations were still determined 
by the yardstick of important U.S. interests in the Middle East. Even though the growing 
criticism of Turkey’s Kurdish policies by the U.S. Congress occasionally brought tension 
to the bilateral relationship in the 1990s and 2000s, the White House continued to value 
Turkey’s role in supporting various U.S. policies. It comes as no surprise that the Turkish 
military operation in northern Iraq in February 2008 failed to cause a rift in U.S-Turkish 
relations, a development that was foreseen as certain by the majority of the international 
press throughout 2007.  
B.  KURDISTAN’S HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: KURDISH SOCIETY 
AND LOCAL RIVALRIES 
The historical background of the Kurds can be traced back to before the birth of 
Christ. Nader Entessar suggests that the Kurds are descendants of Indo-European tribes 
who settled in the Zagros Mountains during the sixth century B.C.11 The area where 
Turkey, Iraq, and Iran meet, and where the Kurdish element is still the majority, was 
given the name Kurdistan in the early 13th century A.D. by the Arabs and the Iranians. 
The term “Kurdistan” indicated the administrative organization of the Kurds, based on 
chiefdoms and principalities.12  
The Kurds are the fourth-largest ethnic group in the Middle East. Figures from 
2004 suggest that there were, at the time, a total of 24 million Kurds in Kurdistan, 11.5 
million in Turkey, 5 million in Iraq, and 6 million in Iran.13 In Turkey, the majority of the 
Kurdish population speaks Kurmanji; however, a considerable number of Kurds speak 
Zaza, a local dialect, or Turkish. Additionally, Turkey’s Kurds are further divided along 
religious lines, with about 70 percent believed to be Sunnis and the rest Alevis.14 
                                                 
11 Nader Entessar, Kurdish Ethnonationalism (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 1992), 3. 
12 Beverly Milton-Edwards and Peter Hinchcliffe, Conflicts in the Middle East since 1945, 2nd ed. 
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Factionalism, along with conflicting self-interests of the local tribal leaders and their 
political divisions have traditionally dictated political developments in Kurdistan, and 
have forged complex relations between its rulers and central authorities throughout the 
centuries.       
1. Early Kurdish Nationalism 
The emergence of Kurdish nationalism may be attributed to the disintegration of 
the Ottoman Empire in the aftermath of World War I. Therefore, as Hakan Ozoglu 
argues, Kurdish nationalism was not a cause, but rather the result of the Empire’s fall.15 
The Kurdish local rulers, usually great landowners and descendants of traditional notable 
families who traced their origins to the first Islamic dynasties, promoted a nationalistic 
agenda only when the Empire’s collapse seemed inevitable. The Kurdish nationalist 
rhetoric was sometimes secessionist and sometimes autonomist, depending on the 
ideological background of Kurdish leaders. 
At the end of World War I, Kurdish notables who were eager to promote an 
independent or even autonomous status for Kurdistan established the Society for the 
Advancement of Kurdistan (SAK) in December 1918. The divergence of ideological 
currents within the Kurdish nationalist camp was exemplified by the split of the SAK in 
1920 into the autonomists (led by Sayyid Abdulkadir) and the secessionists (led by Emir 
Ali Bedirhan).   
a. The Autonomists and the Semdinan Family  
The Semdinan family, headed by Sayyid Ubeydullah, took advantage of 
the power vacuum in Kurdistan after the completion of Sultan Mahmud’s campaign 
against the Kurdish tribes, and managed to assert its control over a large part of 
Kurdistan. In 1880, Ubeydullah decided that he had to expand his area of control. 
Therefore, he triggered an uprising against the Qajars of Iran and the Ottomans. Feeling 
confident that he would defeat the Qajar forces, he invaded northwestern Iran in 
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September 1880. However, his troops suffered a humiliating defeat at the hands of the 
Iranians. His rule ended when the Ottomans exiled him to the Hijaz.  
The Ubeydullah revolt had been linked by some historians with the early 
Kurdish nationalist movement, because of Ubeydullah’s plans to establish a self-
governing Kurdish entity. The nationalist argument is dismissed by Ozoglu, on the 
grounds that Ubeydullah’s militia force was composed of various ethic groups with 
hardly any unified nationalist agenda.16 Therefore, he suggests that the Ubeydullah revolt 
should be seen as the struggle of a Kurdish leader to establish his undisputed authority 
over most of Kurdistan, as opposed to a struggle driven by nationalist idealism.  
Ubeydullah’s son, Abdulkadir, assumed the presidency of the SAK and 
led the autonomist current of Kurdish nationalism. In the aftermath of the Young Turk 
revolution of 1908, Enver Pasa sought Abdulkadir’s assistance in persuading the Kurdish 
tribes to pledge allegiance to the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) regime. The 
CUP had been founded in 1889 by students in the military-medical academy as an 
underground organization that sought to resist the autocratic rule of Abdulhamid, and 
secure the territorial integrity of the Empire by promoting the ideals of Ottomanism.17 
Abdulkadir agreed to collaborate with the CUP regime and tried to convince the Kurdish 
local rulers to accept the new regime’s authority. In parallel with his activity in the SAK, 
he became a high official in the Ottoman bureaucracy.  
Abdulkadir seemed to favor only autonomy for his Kurdish state. 
According to a report of the acting high commissioner in Istanbul, “in private 
conversations [Abdulkadir claimed that] what Kurdistan needs is administrative 
separation under British auspices, and that, if this were assured, independence from 
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b. The Secessionists and the Bedirhani Family 
Abdulkadir’s autonomist rhetoric infuriated the secessionist group of the 
Bedirhani family. Emin Ali Bedirhan, vice-president of the SAK, expelled Abdulkadir 
from the society. Abdulkadir responded by calling elections. He was reelected as 
president of the SAK, leaving Bedirhan’s camp no other alternative but to secede and 
found a counter-organization, the Society for the Kurdish Social Organization (SKSO).  
The SKSO advocated the independence of Kurdistan. The only issue the 
two separate societies had in common was their dislike for the proponents of Kemalism, 
an ideology that favored the creation of a unitary Turkish state and the silencing of any 
nationalist aspirations. Bedirhan even dared to propose that his society collaborate with 
Greek forces against the Kemalist challenge. The British High Commissioner in Istanbul 
reported in 1921:  
…he and his friends had come into touch with the Greek representative 
here, who had listened favorably to the suggestion of a Kurdish movement 
against the Kemalists, which, without any formal co-operation, would 
promote the interests of both Greece and Kurdish nationalists.19 
C. THE TREATY OF SÈVRES: THE LOST OPPORTUNITY FOR 
KURDISTAN 
In the aftermath of World War I, the Committee of Deliverance (CD), a Kurdish 
committee that aimed to promote the Kurdish nationalist agenda through contacts with 
the Western powers, nominated General Sherif Pasha, a leading figure of the Kurdish 
nationalist movement, as the representative of the Kurds at the Paris Peace Conference. 
The presence of General Sherif at the peace conference did not satisfy the participants, 
especially the British. Lord Curzon, head of the British delegation to Sèvres, was reported 
arguing that “after enquiries in Constantinople, Baghdad, and elsewhere, I have found it 
impossible to find any representative Kurd…No Kurd appears to represent anything more 
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than his clan.”20 The Treaty of Sèvres, signed in August 1920 by the Sultan, contained 
promising clauses for the independence of Kurdistan, specifically: 
Article 62: A Commission sitting at Constantinople and composed of three 
members appointed by the British, French, and Italian Governments 
respectively shall draft within three months from the coming into force of 
the present Treaty a scheme of local autonomy for the predominantly  
 
Kurdish areas lying east of the Euphrates, south of the southern boundary 
of Armenia as it may be hereafter determined, and north of the frontier of 
Turkey with Syria and Mesopotamia….21 
Article 64: If within one year from the coming into force of the present 
Treaty the Kurdish peoples within the areas defined in Article 62 shall 
address themselves to the Council of the League of Nations in such a 
manner as to show that a majority of the population of these areas desires 
independence from Turkey, and if the Council then considers that these 
peoples are capable of such independence and recommends that it should 
be granted to them, Turkey hereby agrees to execute such a 
recommendation, and to renounce all rights and title over these areas….22 
The Treaty of Sevres was vigorously resisted by Kemal’s nationalists, and thus 
was never ratified by the Turks. It was replaced in 1923 by the Treaty of Lausanne, which 
included no provisions for Kurdistan; in contrast, it ascribed minority status to groups 
within the Turkish borders only on a religious basis. Thus, Muslim Kurds could not 
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II. THE TURKISH KURDISH QUESTION IN THE PERIOD 
BETWEEN THE 1920S AND THE EARLY 1980S 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
Turkey’s Kurds participated in the Turkish War of Independence in the early 
1920s on the assumption that the Turkish Republic would be based on the equality of the 
Turks and Kurds, and that the new state would continue to be the guardian of Islamic 
values. In that regard, the Grand National Assembly (GNA) had adopted a protocol in 
late 1919 which recognized the “national and social rights of the Kurds.”23 
In February 1922, the GNA began to discuss the details of establishing an 
autonomous Kurdish entity. The draft plan provided for the election of a Kurdish 
National Assembly by universal suffrage. However, the GNA retained the power to 
approve the holder of the Kurdish governor’s office, and to command the Kurdish 
National Guard. Although the official language of the autonomous province would be 
Turkish, the use of the Kurdish language was actually encouraged. According to article 
16 of the draft law, the Kurdish National Assembly was supposed to focus primarily on 
the foundation of a university with law and medical departments. The draft plan 
concerning Kurdish autonomy was approved by the GNA, but was never put in force.24  
At the beginning of 1923, leading figures of the political establishment had still 
no difficulty in talking about the Kurdish people as a group with a different identity. 
However, there was a clear change of attitude. During the meetings for the drafting of the 
Lausanne Treaty, the Turkish representative, Ismet Inonu, argued that the Kurds had 
Turkish origins, and that there was no difference between the two groups in terms of 
customs and manners. In Izmit in January 1923, Kemal Ataturk himself stated that, 
instead of a separate Kurdish entity, he would support the establishment of local 
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autonomies in the regions where the Kurdish population was the majority because “it 
cannot be correct to try to draw another border [between Kurds and Turks]….”25  
By the spring of 1923, the Kemalists’ policies vis-à-vis the Kurdish question had 
profoundly changed. Kemal declared that “the state which we have just created is a 
Turkish state.”26 He intended to modernize the social structures and build a secular state 
along European lines. He was also determined to pursue the liberalization of the society 
from its Islamic heritage, and in doing so, viewed the revolution in the 1920s as “the 
embodiment of the enlightenment progress,” and the Turks as the “cultural carriers” of 
this progress and modernity.27 In that context, Islam had to be removed from the public 
domain. The caliphate was officially abolished on March 4, 1924. All Kurdish 
organizations, publications, and the Kurdish language were outlawed.  
This chapter demonstrates that Turkish effort to eradicate Kurdish nationalism 
was not challenged by the West. The United States and Europe were too preoccupied 
with the Soviet threat during the Cold War years to criticize Turkey’s Kurdish policy. 
Furthermore, the international human rights regime was too weak to influence U.S. and 
European policies vis-à-vis the fate of Turkey’s Kurds; however, that would change 
dramatically in the 1990s.  
B.  TURKISH DOMESTIC POLITICS: THE NON-RECOGNITION OF 
MINORITY STATUS TO THE KURDS 
In the mid-1920s, Ankara had examined the possibility of deporting its Kurdish 
community to neighboring countries. Indeed, when Henry Dobbs, the British High 
Commissioner in Baghdad, visited Ankara in late 1926, the Turkish Foreign Minister told 
him that his government had reached the conclusion that the Kurds could never be 
integrated into the Turkish society. The minister said that the Turks had succeeded in 
driving the Greeks and Armenians out of their holy land and “her next move would be to 
get rid of the Kurds…Turkey will never take them back.”28  
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In 1934, the GNA enacted the Settlement Law (Law No. 2510), which assigned to 
Kurdistan the status of area closed to civilian settlement. The specific law determined that 
areas where the local language was not Turkish were to be evacuated, and their 
inhabitants moved to Turkish-speaking regions for assimilation into Turkey’s culture. 
The principal aim of the law was to disperse Turkey’s Kurds throughout western Anatolia 
in such a way that they would not make up more that 5 percent of the local population in 
any place.29 It was believed that such a policy would lead to full Kurdish assimilation. 
Although the plan to eradicate Kurdish identity was ambitious, it was never implemented, 
for the state would have had to spend a tremendous amount of resources in order to 
uproot millions of Kurds and settle them in the western provinces.  
Under the Law of Maintenance of Order of 1938, the Turkish authorities gave 
Turkish names to thousands of Kurdish villages, and the word “Kurdistan” was taken out 
of history books. From then on, the Kurds were referred as “Mountain Turks.”30 In an 
attempt to create full assimilation, Kurdish families were obliged to give Turkish names 
to their children.  
Meanwhile, the state sponsored scientific research which proved beyond any 
doubt the blood bond between Kurds and Turks. One author of such studies argued that  
the one and only ideal that motivated me to write this book was [the desire 
to liberate] these common Turkish and Turkoman tribespeople …who in 
reality are of Turkish blood and pure Turkish stock-[from] the suffering of 
speaking these half-baked [Kurdish] languages.31 
1. The First Kurdish Revolts 
In the mid-1920s, due to the severe restrictions on Kurdish cultural heritage and 
religious traditions, the first Kurdish rebellion occurred, led by Shaykh Said of Piran. 
Said was prompted to revolt by the activism of a secret organization, the Kurdish 
Independence Society (Azadi), which was founded in 1924. The Turkish authorities were 
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aware of the underground activities of the organization, and had systematically pursued 
its dissolution by the paradigmatic punishment of its members. According to Robert 
Olson, Azadi had three main objectives: “to deliver the Kurds from Turkish oppression; 
to give Kurds freedom and opportunity to develop their country; and to obtain British 
assistance, realizing Kurdistan could not stand alone.”32 
In an effort to attract the support of various Kurdish tribes, Said declared his 
vision for the restoration of the caliphate and the independence of the Kurds. The Turkish 
authorities responded vigorously and crushed the unrest by hanging the leader and about 
50 of his followers in the town of Diyarbakir. Hundreds of Kurdish villages that were 
suspected of supporting the rebellion were destroyed.33 Although the Turkish government 
had imposed martial law in the Kurdish region and no reporters were allowed to visit the 
area, British diplomats in Anatolia were receiving information about “Kurds being 
hanged wholesale, massacred, and practically crushed beyond recovery.”34 
Another significant Kurdish revolt was the one organized by Ihsan Nuri Pasha, a 
former Ottoman officer. The revolt broke out in northern Turkish Kurdistan in the 
summer of 1928; it received support from Kurdish intellectuals who had formed a new 
pro-independence organization, the Khoyboun (Independence).35 The aim of Khoyboun 
was to organize the dispersed Kurdish forces and support Nuri’s movement. The 
leadership of the organization believed that, taking into consideration the ill-conceived 
revolt of 1925-1927, a new Kurdish campaign should be carefully organized and 
executed by a well-trained, non-tribal, armed group. Khoyboun’s founders sought to form 
a revolutionary government and an army that would be deployed in mountainous 
Kurdistan, and to attract support from all tribesmen. The Kurdish organization received 
some funds from the Odessa-based International Minority Movement, and was also 
promised support by the Armenian Dashnak Party. France and Britain declined to provide 
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any sort of assistance; however, Nuri was supported by Iran’s Reza Shah, who allowed 
the Kurdish rebels to retreat into Iran in order to rearm and stage attacks against the 
Turkish authorities from a “safe haven.”  
By the autumn of 1929, Nuri’s rebellion had gathered momentum and controlled a 
vast area, including Bitlis, Van, Ararat, and Botan. In 1930, the Iranian government 
reached a preliminary agreement with Turkey concerning territorial disputes between the 
two countries. In exchange, Iran agreed to cut off its support to Nuri’s forces. During the 
summer of 1930, the Turkish army defeated the rebels and reasserted its control over 
Turkish Kurdistan.  
In 1937-1938, the Dersim region became the epicenter of a new Kurdish revolt. 
Dersim always attracted the government’s attention, because its Kurdish tribes were 
notorious for their tendency to disregard state authority. The Turkish government sent 
approximately 25,000 troops to confront 1,500 Kurdish guerillas. The leader of the 
rebels, Sayyid Riza, an Alevi cleric, in his letter to the British Foreign Secretary Sir 
Anthony Eden, described the plight of the Kurdish minority and pleaded for international 
intervention. The Turkish army defeated the Kurdish rebels. During the conflict, about 
40,000 Kurds lost their lives, thousands were deported, and a special army corps was 
permanently stationed in Dersim.  
2. The Post-World War II Environment-Political Pluralism and Military 
Interventions 
The one-party system, under which Kemal’s Republican People’s Party (RPP) 
was the sole political organization since the early days of Turkish independence, 
collapsed after World War II. In 1946, the Democratic Party (DP) launched its political 
platform by promising to fight against obsolete policies which suppressed the citizens’ 
human rights and their civic-religious-economic liberties. Indeed, after its sweeping 
victory in 1950, the DP re-introduced religious instruction in public schools, financed the 
construction of thousands of mosques throughout the country, and permitted the 
muezzins to recite the call to prayer in Arabic. Islam was once again welcomed in the 
public domain, a development that Kurdistan longed for.  
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The next strategic move of the DP was the co-optation of the Kurdish agha class, 
which had been vigorously persecuted by the Kemalists. Arguing in favor of private 
property and the advantages of large estates in terms of productivity, the DP leadership 
safeguarded the rights of the aghas-landlords who were in a position to control the vast 
majority of the peasants’ votes. According to David McDowall, the aghas had gradually 
and noiselessly forgotten the fundamentals of the Kurdish agenda, and had used their 
control over the peasants not as a way to further Kurdistan’s ethnic interests, but rather to 
integrate themselves and their sons into the Turkish state elite.36 The alliance between the 
aghas and the state was so successful that a British diplomat traveling in Kurdistan in 
1956 admitted that “I did not catch the faintest breath of Kurdish nationalism which the 
most casual observer in Iraq cannot fail to notice.”37 
The coup ď ètat of May 1960 brought no major changes to the unitary policies of 
the Turkish state. The National Unity Committee (NUC) enacted a law in early 1961 that 
authorized the founding of regional boarding schools as vehicles of forced assimilation 
for Kurdish students. President Gursel, the leading figure of the coup, stated that “no 
nation exists with a personality of its own, calling itself Kurdish,” and insisted that Kurds 
and Turks were racial brothers.38 However, Kurdish separatism and the rising activism by 
leftist groups did not prevent the generals from introducing a progressive constitution in 
May 1961 which provided for all basic civic freedoms.  
The pluralism of the new constitution and the restoration of democracy after the 
1960 coup coincided with the advent of an educated generation of Kurds who had not 
experienced the nationalist fervor of the ’20s and ’30s and had no recollection of the 
harsh state repression that still haunted their parents. University attendance brought more 
and more Kurds together and exposed them to new ideas about nation-building.  
In 1965, the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Turkey (TKDP), the first underground 
Kurdish group in Turkey since the 1930s, was established. The group favored a 
federation within existing borders, but failed to attract the support of the Kurdish 
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population. Kurdish youth seemed more inclined to subscribe to the leftist ideology of the 
Turkish Workers’ Party (TWP). Leftist student organizations and societies proliferated 
and attracted a considerable number of educated Kurds.  
The Turkish Left criticized most of the state’s policies; however, it was almost 
indifferent to the Kurdish question. The Left’s silence forced a group of Kurdish 
intellectuals to establish their own organization, the Revolutionary Eastern Cultural 
Hearths (DDKO) in the late 1960s. In October 1970, the group’s founders were arrested 
and charged with separatism. It was clear that political liberalism could not match with 
Kurdish nationalism in Turkey.39  
In the early 1970s, Turkish leftist groups started resorting to bank robberies and 
kidnappings in order to support their activities, embarrassing the credibility of state 
security agencies. The radical Left was making preparations to establish camps in the 
mountains and then launch its revolutionary campaign. Turkey was further destabilized 
by large-scale workers’ strikes. Political extremism challenged not only the country’s 
internal security, but also its role as a credible NATO member and U.S. ally. In that 
context, the second coup of March 1971 sought to eradicate all sources of radicalism and 
introduce a new constitution that would ensure the state’s control of political activism. 
Martial law was declared, freezing most of the manifestations of a vibrant civil society. 
In October 1973, the military regime allowed a return to civilian control, and in 
early 1974, Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit declared a general amnesty. Kurds who had 
received prison sentences or left the country resumed their political activism. However, 
they now believed that they should form their own political groups, legitimate or 
underground, because the Turkish Left could no longer be trusted. It was in this volatile  
environment that Abdullah Ocalan, the future leader of the PKK, came to the fore. 
Ocalan, a student in the political science department at Ankara University, was arrested 
in 1972 during a demonstration in Ankara and received a seven-month prison sentence. 
He later admitted that “prison was a school on advancing the political struggle.”40 In  
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1975, at a secret meeting in the Dikmen suburb of Ankara, Ocalan and about fifteen of 
his followers decided to form a Marxist-Leninist group that would fight for an 
independent Kurdistan.41 
3. The First Steps of the PKK 
Ocalan saw the collapse of the Barzani nationalist movement in northern Iraq in 
March 1975 as proof to his belief that a nationalist organization had to be independent of 
all major powers, including the United States and the Soviet Union. The Barzani failure 
was also a sign that the tribal organization of Kurdish society and the dominant position 
of the large landowners over the peasants and their votes were serious obstacles to the 
Kurdish liberation movement.  
Ocalan argued that the Kurdish revolt should start immediately and that the 
Kurdish agenda could be promoted only through armed struggle. Rival groups that 
advocated a democratic solution or even a limited resort to violence were seen as 
obstacles to the one-party rule that he believed was imperative. Ocalan’s party favored a 
course of action that targeted the rightist groups that subscribed to the ideas of Turkish 
nationalism, the leftist groups that disregarded Kurdish interests, and the Kurdish groups 
that rejected Ocalan’s radical thinking.42 
The PKK was officially formed on November 28, 1978, during a secret meeting 
of its leading members at Fis village outside Diyarbakir. However, there was no time for 
PKK to initiate its campaign. After the arrest of a key PKK member by the Turkish 
authorities and an increased military presence in the southeast, Ocalan was forced to 
abandon Turkey in early 1979 and settle in Syria.  
While in Syria, Ocalan established training arrangements with many Palestinian 
organizations, including Fatah, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the 
Palestinian Popular Struggle Front, and also the Lebanese Communist Party. Meanwhile, 
Israel’s military intervention in Lebanon in the summer of 1982 had led to the 
deterioration of the security status in Bekaa. Realizing that the border region between 
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Turkey and Syria was inappropriate for staging attacks against Turkish targets, Ocalan, 
sometime in 1982, reached a deal with Massoud Barzani that permitted the PKK to use 
the Turkish-Iraqi border region. The agreement also allocated land to Ocalan’s guerillas 
to build their camps.43     
In Turkey, the widespread political violence in the country, perpetuated by 
clashes between leftist and rightist groups, provoked a third military intervention in 
September 1980. A year earlier, Bulent Ulusu, commander-in-chief of the Turkish fleet 
and a leading figure of the 1980 coup, had told a journalist that the presence of the 
Turkish army in the southeast was seen with increasing resentment by the local 
population. He argued that “the East is boiling; the communists and the Kurds are in 
complete cooperation there.”44  
The generals revised Turkey’s constitution in a way that increased the power of 
the executive and curtailed civic rights. Its article 14, which banned political activism 
based on class, sect, language, or race, was indicative of the new political orientation of 
the Turkish regime.45 “We have to sacrifice some personal rights for the security of the 
community,” General Kenan Evren, leader of the coup, wrote in his memoirs.46 The pre-
coup political parties were dissolved, while the new ones were forbidden to establish 
youth or women’s unions or open offices in the rural areas. University students, 
professors and civil servants could no longer formally join political parties. The military 
regime was aiming to depoliticize the youth and the educated classes, hoping to eradicate 
the sources that had generated political extremism during the 70s.47  
The military regime did not only rely on legal reforms to curb Kurdish extremism. 
According to Ertugrul Kurkcu, in late 1983 and before the transition to democratic rule, 
the leaders of the coup made an effort to transform the Kemalist ideology by 
incorporating Islamic elements within it. The idea was that, if the state ceased 
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demonizing the role of religion in the public domain and, instead, promoted the 
traditional Islamic character of the society, then it could co-opt the conservative leaders 
of the Kurdish community, and discredit the Marxist-atheist militants of the various 
Kurdish organizations. Advancing the Islamic values of the conservative Turkish society 
seemed a fair price to pay, in exchange for national cohesion and the marginalization of 
extremist elements.48       
C. U.S. POLICY AND TURKEY: THE IMPERATIVES OF THE COLD WAR 
1. Early U.S.-Turkish Relations and the Kurds 
The beginning of formal diplomatic relations between the Turkish Republic and 
the United States can be traced to the period following the end of the Turkish War of 
Independence. Joseph C. Grew, American Minister to Switzerland, signed a Turkish-
American treaty in Lausanne on August 6, 1923 that provided for official diplomatic 
relations between the two countries. The rejection of the Lausanne Treaty by the United 
States on January 18, 1927, due to the strong influence of Armenian interest groups on 
Congress and outstanding political differences between the Republican and Democratic 
parties, displeased Turkey. The Department of State sought to overcome the diplomatic 
tension through an exchange of notes between the American High Commissioner in 
Turkey and the Turkish Foreign Minister. The two sides agreed to proceed with the 
exchange of diplomatic missions, and to hold regular talks on bilateral problems in the 
future, regardless of a future ratification of the Lausanne Treaty by the Senate. 
  The establishment of formal diplomatic relations in 1927 provided the legal 
framework for the activities of American business interests in Turkey; however, from 
Turkey’s point of view, the stance of the United States government and the American 
businessmen toward Turkish nationalism was the most important element of the bilateral 
relations. Between 1927 and 1939, the State Department insisted that its diplomats in 
Ankara refrain from criticizing policies that were dictated by Turkish nationalism.49 In 
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that context, the Kurdish uprisings of the ’20s and ’30s and their harsh suppression by 
state authorities were hardly an issue of concern for the State Department. 
 In the aftermath of World War II, the United States considered the Kurdish 
nationalist rhetoric in Turkey and its neighboring states as a potential tool in the hands of 
the Soviets that could destabilize the Middle East. Reviewing the trends of Soviet foreign 
policy in October 1945, the U.S. Ambassador in Moscow argued that the Kurdish 
community in Turkey was quite strong and it could become a threat to Turkey’s territorial 
integrity if an external actor decided to arm and organize it. However, the Ambassador 
admitted that, so far, there were no indications or intelligence pointing to Soviet 
interference in Turkey’s internal affairs in the southeast. Additionally, he described the 
Kurdish tribes as “individualistic feuding nomads,” whose manipulation by the Soviets 
was not an easy task. The Ambassador speculated that the systematic policy of 
deportations and resettlement of Turkey’s Kurds away from its eastern borders made it 
more difficult for the Soviets to establish contact with the Kurds and mobilize them.50  
However, the Soviets had already engineered the mobilization of the Iranian 
Kurdish community. In April 1946, when the secessionist Kurdish movement in northern 
Iran was still powerful, Acheson, the Acting Secretary of State, informed the U.S. Consul 
at Tabriz, Iran, that the State Department disapproved of the prospect of him visiting the 
Kurdish leaders in Iranian Kurdistan. Acheson argued that such meeting could be 
interpreted by Turkey and Iraq as tacit U.S. support of a future independent Kurdistan, 
which was not a desirable development in the northern Middle East.51  
During informal discussions between American and British diplomats in the U.S. 
Embassy in London on September 21, 1950 concerning the Kurdish role in the Middle 
East, the U.K. representatives stated that they were not particularly worried about 
Kurdish activism. The British argued that the Kurds had never been united, their revolts 
had traditionally been ill-organized, and that current Kurdish unrest was hardly a 
potential challenge to Western interests in the Middle East. The U.S. delegates informed 
the British side that the State Department was already establishing new consulates 
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throughout the Middle East. The Americans admitted that they were eager to establish 
closer contacts with the Kurds through the new diplomatic missions near the Kurdish 
regions. During the London meeting, both sides agreed that all dealings with the Kurds 
should be sought through the official governments of their host countries. Additionally, it 
was agreed that support to the Kurds should be restricted, because unlimited Kurdish 
build up could be a source of further unrest.52   
Later that year, a policy statement which was prepared in the State Department 
addressed all sides of the Kurdish question in the northern Middle East and sought to 
propose policy options for the United States. The statement pointed out that the Kurdish 
tribes of Iraq, Iran, Syria, and Turkey were divided and ill-organized, and local state 
authorities had the resources to put down any uprising of domestic origin and direction. 
However, the State Department estimated that, if a small, well-equipped force of Soviet 
“Kurds” crossed the borders into Iraq, Iran, and Syria, it could lead to a massive Kurdish 
insurrection, possibly uncontrollable by the local security forces.53 The authors of the 
statement also argued that Britain and the United States should jointly try to ease the 
tensions in Iraqi Kurdistan by providing technical assistance. The assistance should be 
used to improve the administrative structures of northern Iraq and raise the standards of 
living for the Kurds. Surprisingly, no such recommendations were made for the Kurdish 
communities in Turkey, Iran, or Syria.  
Fear that the Soviet Union had the ability to manipulate the Kurdish communities 
in the northern Middle East was still apparent in the late 1950s. In 1959, the Shah of Iran 
complained to President Eisenhower that the Communists were using Radio Cairo 
broadcasts in order to mobilize the Kurds to revolt against their host-states and establish a 
free Kurdistan. The Shah mentioned that, when the Russians occupied Azerbaijan, they 
partitioned the region into Turkish and Kurdish provinces, and installed a Kurdish 
administration. The Iranian leader pointed out that Western self-restraint before Soviet 
aggression benefited only the Russians.  
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The U.S. State Department was well aware of the relation between Kurdish 
nationalism and Soviet foreign policy. Based on that fact and the build-up of tensions in 
the Kurdish regions of Iraq and Iran, the United States had adopted the position that  
the United States considers the Kurdish problem in Iraq an internal matter 
which should be resolved internally…does not support Kurdish activities 
against the Government of Iraq…we believe the future well-being of 
Kurds in Iraq, as well as those in Iran and Turkey is inseparably tied to the 
well-being of the countries in which they reside.54 
In a memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense 
McNamara in August 1963, U.S. officials clearly expressed their opinion about what U.S. 
policy should be toward the Kurds. It was proposed that the United States should 
continue to favor assimilation of the Kurds within existing boundaries and granting of 
some kind of local self-administration in predominately Kurdish provinces.55 
2. The U.S.-Turkish Relations and the Soviet Factor 
The aggressive policies of the Soviet Union in seeking Russian-Turkish co-
administration of the Turkish straits in the aftermath of World War II, and Stalin’s 
support for Georgian and Armenian claims on Turkish lands, fostered a strategic 
relationship between Turkey and the United States.56 In Khrushchev’s words, it was 
Stalin’s policies that “succeeded in frightening the Turks right into the open arms of the 
Americans.”57 Indeed, in the late 1940s, the Truman administration reached the 
conclusion that it was imperative to keep Turkey out of the Soviet Union’s sphere of 
influence. Subsequently, this decision led to the mapping out of a whole new U.S. 
strategy not only toward Turkey, but toward Iran and Greece as well. The new U.S. 
policy of containing Soviet expansion in the eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East 
was formulated in February 1947, when the British government suddenly informed the 
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United States that it had decided to pull its forces out of Greece and Turkey within a 
month. The Truman Doctrine, which was operationalized through the Marshall Plan, was 
made public in March 1947, and aimed to secure the Western orientation of both Turkey 
and Greece.   
Turkey’s decision to participate in the Korean War in the early 1950s signaled the 
Turkish desire to join the newly established North-Atlantic Alliance and receive security 
guarantees from the United States. In exchange, Turkey promoted its geo-strategic 
significance for the defense of Europe. According to the first contingency plans in the 
event of a Soviet attack southwards, the Turkish army was expected to delay the Soviet 
advances in Thrace, and then withdraw to Anatolia and further delay the Soviet campaign 
in the mountainous southeast.58  
Within the United States, the strategic importance of Turkey was not equally 
appreciated by all. Admiral Forrest Sherman, Chief of Naval Operations, argued that 
Turkey and Greece were important countries for the defense of Western Europe, and 
therefore both states should be protected by the newly established security institutions of 
the West. On the other hand, Army Chief of Staff General Lawton Collins argued that 
Turkey was a Middle Eastern country, belonged to the British sphere of influence, and 
therefore the Commonwealth was responsible for its security.  
It was General Dwight Eisenhower, Supreme Allied Commander of Europe, who 
would play the most decisive role in formulating the framework for cooperation between 
Turkey and the United States. Eisenhower argued that there were mutual benefits in the 
Turkish-American relationship, and that Turkey deserved security guarantees from the 
U.S. in order to secure its cooperation on international diplomacy issues. In February 
1952, Greece and Turkey were formally admitted to NATO.59 
In 1955, Turkey, alongside Iran, Pakistan, and Britain, joined the Baghdad Pact 
(Iraq signed the pact but never really participated in the alliance), a military alliance that 
was supposed to coordinate the efforts of its member states against Soviet expansion. 
Meanwhile, high-altitude U-2s and strike aircraft equipped with tactical nuclear weapons 
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were stationed at Incirlik airbase in 1956 and 1957, respectively, while intelligence-
gathering platforms were installed along the Turkish Black Sea coast. The geo-strategic 
location of Turkey was indeed indispensable to the in-depth surveillance of Soviet 
moves.  
The Eisenhower administration believed that assisting Turkey with building its 
own reliable armed forces was a more cost-effective strategy than allocating additional 
U.S. forces for its defense. It was argued that economic assistance to Turkey was the 
most effective way to secure U.S. interests in the Middle East.60 In any case, the 
accession of Turkey to NATO had provided the necessary security guarantees for the 
country. For example, Khrushchev stated in October 1957 that if there was a war, Turkey 
would hardly last a day. The U.S. State Department answered back that “if aggression 
took place against Turkey, the United States would fulfill its obligations within NATO 
and aid Turkey with all its power.”61  
However, after the Cuban missile crisis and the beginning of détente in the mid-
1960s, the United States estimated that the northern Middle East region was no longer 
under immediate danger of a Soviet offensive. Secretary of Defense McNamara stated 
before a Congressional committee in 1965 that the countries of that region had to 
understand that the immediate danger to their security did not stem from the Soviet 
Union, but rather from the presence of powerful minorities within their borders, as well 
as existing social inequalities.62  
Although the imperatives of the Cold War dictated a close cooperation between 
the United States and Turkey, the bilateral relationship was often frustrated by Turkish 
mistrust of U.S. intentions. Barry Rubin and Kemal Kirisci have argued that Turkish 
doubts regarding U.S. intentions vis-à-vis Turkey were fueled by three major 
developments that marked the bilateral relations. First, the removal of tactical nuclear 
weapons, the famous Jupiter missiles, from Turkey in 1962, in the aftermath of the Cuban 
missile crisis, without any prior consultations with the Turkish government brought about 
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serious tension in U.S.-Turkish relations. Second, in 1964, President Lyndon Johnson 
sent a letter to Prime Minister Ismet Inonu, one of the founders of the Turkish Republic, 
regarding the developments in Cyprus. President Johnson warned the Turkish 
government to abstain from using U.S. weapons in Cyprus, and made clear that, if 
Turkish military intervention in the island triggered a Soviet counter-response, Turkey 
should not count on U.S. support. The letter has been considered one of the most 
humiliating incidents in Turkish diplomatic history and struck a serious blow at the 
bilateral relations. Third, after the 1974 Turkish military intervention in Cyprus, the 
United States Congress imposed an arms embargo on Turkey that lasted for nearly three 
years.63 
D. EUROPEAN POLICY AND TURKEY: THE FIRST STEPS TOWARD 
EUROPEAN INTEGRATION  
According to Robert Olson, after the end of World War I, the European powers, 
especially the United Kingdom, examined the possibility of supporting the establishment 
of an independent Kurdistan.  There were two main geopolitical reasons for this. The first 
was to create a buffer zone between the Turkish Republic and the Turkic-speaking 
peoples in the Caucasus region, particularly in Azerbaijan. The potential of Muslim unity 
was seen as a serious threat to European interests in the Middle East.  
The second reason for supporting Kurdish independence was the prospect of 
restricting the state power of Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Syria. A Kurdish state would 
constitute a buffer between Turks and Arabs, would command most of the water 
resources in the region, and would allow Britain or France to use the Kurdish state 
against the governments of the above-mentioned countries whenever they deemed it 
necessary to do so.64 
 However, the consolidation of power by Kemal’s nationalists forced the British to 
rethink their Kurdish strategy. After 1921 and Faysal’s accession to the throne of Iraq, the 
British realized that the Kurdish population of Mosul province in northern Iraq was 
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essential for effective control over the country. The British saw the Sunni Kurds as a 
necessary balance to the Shi’i Arabs of the south, who constituted the majority of the 
country’s Arab population.  
The new British policy was most evident in their negotiations with the Turks on 
the Mosul question. In a letter to the British principal negotiator on March 16, 1925, Sir 
Henry Dobbs argued that  
the Kurds in the tracts which Turkey desires have been the short anchor of 
British influence in Iraq. It was only through the solid pro-British Kurdish 
“bloc” in the constituent assembly that the Anglo-Iraq Treaty was 
accepted in June 1924…a cession of loyal Kurdish tracts to Turkey would 
engender mistrust of us throughout Iraq, not only among the Kurds but 
among the Arabs.65 
In that context, the United Kingdom sought to marginalize Iraqi Kurdish leaders 
such as Shaykhs Barzani, Mahmud, and Taha, who had supporters in Turkey and could 
stage destabilizing revolts in both countries. By 1932, only Shaykh Barzani’s followers 
still constituted a considerable force in Iraqi Kurdistan, although his power was reduced 
after the devastating British air raids of 1931-1932.66 
It is worth noting that the Kurdish revolts of the ’20s and ’30s were not covered in 
length in the European press, and when European newspapers reported the Kurdish 
revolts in southeast Turkey, they tended to highlight Turkey’s point of view. For 
example, on July 16, 1937, The Times of London reported the Dersim events under the 
headline “Those Who Object to Education, A Revolt Suppressed by Troops.” Basile 
Nikitine, a former Russian diplomat in Turkey, wrote a letter to the newspaper’s editors 
and argued that “it is an error to suppose that the Kurds object to education; what they are 
resisting is turkification.”67 
 After World War II, with the consolidation of democracy throughout Western 
Europe, Kurdish societies and clubs proliferated in many European capitals. The Center 
d’Etudes Kurdes of Paris was founded in 1949. The Kurdish Students Society in Europe 
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(KSSE) was founded in 1956 and soon established branches in many European cities. In 
1969, the Society of Fighters for Kurdistan was established in Uppsala, Sweden. All 
societies organized meetings where the developments in the Kurdish regions were 
discussed; additionally, they financed the publication of pamphlets and journals in 
Kurdish and Arabic.68 
 Meanwhile, Turkey had already taken its first steps toward integration into 
Europe. In 1950, it became a member of the Council of Europe, and in 1963, the then-
European Economic Community accepted Turkey as an associate member. The 
cooperation between the two sides was disrupted by the coup of 1980, when the 
European Community (E.C.) decided to freeze its formal relations with Ankara and 
suspend flows of economic aid. The reaction of the Council of Europe was even stronger; 
it expelled all Turkish representatives from its proceedings. Although the interruption of 
European aid funds did not cause serious problems to the country’s economic program, it 
nevertheless had a “symbolic significance” and, according to William Hale, it provided 
additional incentives to the military regime to permit the transition to democracy in 
1983.69  
E.  CONCLUSION 
Since its inception, Kemalism sought the top-down transformation of Turkey into 
a modern state of European standards. The establishment of a strong unitary state could 
not afford either the recognition of the society’s multiethnic character, or the attachment 
to Islamic values and institutions which were considered obsolete or a threat to the 
project of modernization. The formulation of the Kemalists’ decision to deny the 
“otherness” of the Kurds was gradual, since, in the early ’20s, they vacillated between 
autonomy and other forms of limited self-administration for the Kurds. But when the 
decision was made to subdue Kurdish nationalism, the state remained focused on that 
central principle of Kemalism irrespective of the parties that led the governing coalitions 
or the disruption of democratic rule by the military. Moreover, after the 1980 coup, the 
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army proclaimed itself the guardian of Kemal’s legacy, and rebuilt the governing 
structures in such way that it could indefinitely influence central political decisions of the 
civilian leadership. 
Furthermore, Kemalism was based on the principles of constitutionalism and 
popular sovereignty; however, the idiosyncratic project of the top-down transformation of 
a multi-ethnic society into a homogeneous entity of “Turkish citizens,” which would 
forget about old traditions and diverse ethnic backgrounds, distanced Turkish society 
from the liberal models of the West. Heinz Kramer has criticized the authoritarianism of 
Kemal’s regime, arguing that “liberalism and democracy were not part of the Kemalist 
principles.”70 
Said’s revolt was a turning point for Kurdish-Turkish relations. Turkey, realizing 
the potential threat of further territorial dismemberment, intensified the policies of forced 
assimilation of its Kurdish minority. But the three major revolts of the ’20s and ’30s 
demonstrated deep divisions within the Kurdish nationalist movement. Long-lasting 
political differences, alliances with or opposition to the state, and base local interests of 
the Kurdish tribes, all contributed to the fragmentation of Turkey’s Kurdish community 
at critical moments in its history. The lack of active support by major external actors – 
Iranian support in the ’30s was more passive than active, while Soviet rhetoric regarding 
the rights of the Kurds was never operationalized – obliged the Kurds to organize their 
revolts with few means at their disposal. The advanced Turkish army had no difficulty in 
crushing the Kurdish rebellions. The ferocity of the state’s response to the militants was 
so intense that the Kurds remained virtually silent – and ignored – until the ’70s. 
The geo-strategic significance of Turkey, labeled as a frontline state throughout 
the Cold War years, shaped the West’s Turkish policy. The United States and Europe 
were absorbed in their struggle against the Soviet threat; therefore, anything that could 
undermine the territorial integrity of Turkey was viewed as a threat to the West’s core 
interests. Until the early ’80s, neither the E.C. or the U.S. regarded Turkey’s Kurds as a 
minority group whose linguistic and cultural rights were denied by a despotic regime.  
                                                 
70 Heinz Kramer, A Changing Turkey: The Challenge to Europe and the United States (Washington, 
DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2000), 7. 
 34
The Americans did not ignore the Kurdish community in Turkey because they had 
limited knowledge of the Kurdish history. In fact, the United States had established its 
presence in the Middle East before World War II, had monitored the ways in which the 
Russians had manipulated the Kurdish nationalists in Iran and Iraq, and had itself 
supported the Barzani movement in northern Iraq in the ’70s. But no direct or indirect 
interference by the Americans in southeast Anatolia to mobilize the Kurds against the 
state was ever undertaken. 
The Europeans followed America’s lead regarding Turkey’s Kurds. The E.C. left 
the Kurdish question out of the negotiating framework leading to Turkey’s associate 
membership in the E.C. in the early ’60s; the loose joining of Turkey to the emerging 
European establishment had hardly any effect on the E.C.’s economic and social policies. 
It is worth noting that the negotiations between the E.C. and Turkey in the ’60s and ’70s 
were often frustrated by Turkey’s insistence on securing free flows of Turkish 
immigrants to the European labor markets, a request the Europeans rejected. The fate of 
the Kurds, and Turkey’s human rights record, never came up as major issues of concern. 
The European human rights activism of the ’90s was still far away.  
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III. THE TURKISH KURDISH QUESTION IN THE PERIOD 
BETWEEN THE MID-1980S AND THE EARLY 2000S 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
After the mid-1980s, Turkey was destined to fight against a powerful Kurdish 
insurgency that would seriously challenge state authority in the southeast, cause the death 
of thousands of Kurds and Turks, and force the state to curtail civic freedoms. On August 
15, 1984, the PKK initiated its guerilla campaign by attacking Turkish military targets in 
the towns of Eruh and Semdinli. According to one of the participants, “our goal really 
wasn’t to kill a lot of soldiers. The attack was more to gain people’s support and get them 
to join us….”71  
This chapter demonstrates that Turkey’s Kurdish policy in the ’80s and ’90s soon 
caused the country’s human rights record to be labeled as one of the world’s poorest. 
Although the West remained almost silent in the ’80s due to other priorities such as 
containing the Soviet threat, it gradually started to value the third parties’ human rights 
records and their policies vis-à-vis the protection of minority rights. The developments in 
southeast Anatolia embarrassed Turkey internationally by exposing its Kurdish policy to 
the scrutiny of non-governmental organizations, the U.S. Congress, and the European 
Parliament.  
B. TURKISH DOMESTIC POLITICS: THE PKK CHALLENGE 
1. Turkish and Kurdish Atrocities 
One of Turkey’s first reactions to the PKK challenge was to establish a new 
militia force composed of local armed villagers. The institution of temporary village 
guards was officially created in April 1985 through an amendment to the Village Law, 
which allocated the necessary funds for the recruiting of the guards. The first Kurdish 
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tribes to offer manpower for the new institution were those affiliated with the Right and 
far Right political spectrum, or those that already opposed the PKK’s tactics and goals. 
By 1990, there were about 20,000 village guards, and by 1993, approximately 
35,000. The motive to participate in the village guard system was basically economic. In 
1992, village guards received approximately US$230 each month, an income that was 
several-fold above the average per capita income in the area.72 But the village guards 
were not just an additional threat to the PKK’s campaign; they also provided some PKK 
guerillas with a new moral dilemma. “I didn’t want to fight them, they were Kurds too,” 
admitted a former PKK militant.73 
Meanwhile, PKK’s 3rd Congress of October 1986 adopted some radical measures, 
such as forced military conscription of the Kurdish youth. Those Kurds who refused to 
join the ranks of the organization would risk being kidnapped. Conscription aimed to 
demonstrate the authority of the PKK in the Kurdish region and also to increase the 
number of militants. Additionally, the congress concurred with Ocalan’s proposal 
concerning the forced taxation of Kurdish merchants and other businessmen in the 
southeast.  
When the PKK’s campaign started gaining momentum in 1987, the government 
appointed a governor-general over eight Kurdish provinces in the southeast, and a state of 
emergency was declared. The governor-general was vested with extensive powers, 
including the evacuation of villages, although his primary duty was the effective co-
ordination of the various state agencies fighting the insurgents.  
In June 1988, Decree 285 further extended the governor-general’s powers, which 
now included the deportation of Kurds at his own discretion. The rate of village 
evacuations intensified. By 1994, more than 800 Kurdish settlements had been destroyed 
or evacuated, mainly those close to the Iraqi-Turkish borders, while over 750,000 Kurds 
were considered homeless. In his written answer to legislators’ questions, the Minister of 
the Interior admitted in April 1994 that 288 villages and 366 hamlets had been totally 
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evacuated, while 178 villages and 39 hamlets were partially abandoned.74 However, the 
destruction of settlements was continuously denied by the Turkish authorities. In 1995, 
Prime Minister Ciller insisted that the PKK militants, dressed in military uniforms, were 
responsible for the burning of villages. 
The resentment caused by the implementation of the PKK’s “laws” concerning 
conscription and taxation forced many Kurds to join the village guards militia force in 
order to protect their families and their property. On the other hand, the PKK pushed 
even further to undermine the state’s authority in the southeast, preventing Ankara from 
exercising its control over the disputed area. Specifically, it warned contractors and their 
teams who were undertaking public works projects in the area to abandon the area. Their 
technical equipment was set fire. The Kurds were prohibited from joining Turkish 
political parties. Reading Turkish newspapers or watching television was banned. TV 
antennas were removed “so that justice is not merely done; it is seen to be done.”75  
In late 1990, the PKK decided to stop targeting civilians in order to expose the 
magnitude of Turkey’s oppression of its Kurdish minority and the state’s lack of respect 
for universally-recognized human rights. Ocalan announced an amnesty for those village 
guards who would abandon the institution. The state responded by widening the authority 
of the governor-general to include the closure of any publishing house, anywhere in 
Turkey. 
2. President Ozal’s Kurdish Policy in the 1990s 
On the political level, the Turkish establishment started to show some signs of 
willingness to confront the sources of Kurdish unrest in the early 1990s. In July 1990, the 
Social Democrat Populist Party (SHP) publicized the findings of an inquiry concerning 
the situation in the southeast region, and urged the government to display initiative and 
implement radical reforms, including freedom of expression, abolition of the institutions 
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of village guards and the governor-general, lifting of the state of emergency, and 
initiation of a major program of regional development.  
Under this same spirit, in February 1991, President Ozal proposed a draft bill in 
the GNA which put an end to the penalization of the use of Kurdish in public, except in 
broadcasts, publications, and education. Protests by the Kemalists forced Ozal to 
withdraw his proposal. These protests were even joined by the SHP, which had made 
similar recommendations just a few months earlier, but now accused the government of 
betraying Kemal’s legacy, Nevertheless, in April 1991, Ozal re-introduced this 
controversial bill into the GNA, and it was finally adopted after intense debates. Later 
that year, Ozal declared that “it must be made clear that those in the Iraqi Kurdish area 
are relatives of Turkish citizens. So the borders are to some extent artificial, dividing 
people into two sections.”76  
While Ankara’s Assembly was discussing the innovative policies of the Turkish 
President, about half a million Kurdish refugees  from northern Iraq had abandoned their 
homeland and crossed the borders into Turkey. Saddam’s army had responded vigorously 
to the Kurdish uprising in March 1991, driving thousands of Iraqi Kurds toward the 
Turkish and Iranian borders.  
Now Turkey found itself in the awkward position of implementing two 
contradictory policies. On the one hand, the new anti-terror law of 1991 provided the 
state with additional tools to keep its Kurdish minority in check. For instance, Article 8 of 
that law penalized any oral or written propaganda that targeted the unity of the state, 
without taking the intent of the author or speaker into consideration.77  
On the other hand, the Turkish government proceeded to establish formal 
relations with Iraq’s two main Kurdish parties, Barzani’s Kurdistan Democratic Party 
(KDP) and Talabani’s Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK).78According to Ozal’s 
analysis, formal relations between Turkey and the representatives of the Iraqi Kurds had 
the potential of demonstrating to his country’s Kurds that the government was not 
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opposed to Kurds per se, but only to the PKK’s terrorism.79 The cooperation between 
Ankara and Iraqi Kurds reached the point of forcing the Iraqi Kurdish Front to warn the 
PKK in early 1992 that “if it failed to cease activities against Turkey, it would be purged 
from the region.”80  
It was obvious that, so far, Ocalan’s main objective was to plunge Turkey into a 
state of civil conflict and anarchy. Such conditions could reasonably provoke another 
military coup, which in turn would destabilize the democratic institutions and marginalize 
the country at the international level. An international mediation would then be possible, 
resulting in the enforcement of a Turkish Kurdish “safe haven.”81 But the close 
cooperation between Turkey and the Iraqi Kurdish leadership forced the PKK to 
reconsider the desired end state of its campaign. In late 1991, when journalist Ismet Imset 
asked Ocalan whether the prospect of a federal solution to the Kurdish question would be 
acceptable, the PKK leader replied, “Unquestionably this is what we see.”82 
In mid-1992, the unabated Kurdish insurgency forced Ozal to allow the military 
to take the lead in fighting the PKK’s terrorism. Clashes between the PKK and Turkish 
armed forces intensified. The Turkish campaign was assisted by the Iraqi Kurds, who 
imposed considerable restrictions on the PKK’s activism in northern Iraq. Ocalan 
responded by imposing a blockade in Iraqi Kurdistan, simply by threatening the lives of 
the truck drivers. Facing serious shortages of food and fuel as a result of the blockade,  
Talabani and Barzani had no difficulty in agreeing to assist the Turks in their massive 
offensive against PKK militants and their camps in northern Iraq in October and 
November 1992.  
The Turkish offensive in Iraq disrupted the operational capabilities of the PKK. 
Indeed, the Turkish newspaper Sabah revealed in March 1993 that Talabani had met 
Ocalan in February, and the PKK leader had expressed his readiness to stop fighting the 
Turkish state. Moreover, on March 17, 1993, Ocalan himself announced a unilateral 
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ceasefire, effective from 21 March until 15 April, and stated that, if Turkey ceased its 
offensive against his men, “there is no reason why we should not extend our ceasefire…I 
personally would like to be able to return unarmed to the southeast in order to engage in 
political activity.”83 
Although Ozal was initially skeptical about Ocalan’s ceasefire offer, he later 
thought that the PKK’s initiative presented a unique opportunity. He confessed to his 
friend Genciz Candal, a Turkish journalist, that he was thinking about offering a 
piecemeal amnesty: initially, militants who were not charged with particular crimes 
would be allowed to return to their families, then, after a period of two years, their 
commanders would be allowed to return, and finally, after a five year period, Ocalan 
himself. Ozal was not particularly worried about the generals rejecting his plans, because 
they understood that the war of attrition in the southeast could not go on forever. Ozal 
was sure that it would be the hardliners in the parliament who would resist his Kurdish 
policy. On April 15, he said to Candal again that “I am afraid these idiots [the 
government] will ruin everything…if we miss this chance the situation will get much 
worse.”84 But on April 17, 1993, Ozal died. 
The Turkish establishment understood Ocalan’s concessions to be a sign of 
military weakness and desperation. President Ozal’s successor, Demirel, and the General 
Staff signaled their rejection of Ocalan’s offer and their determination to eradicate all 
PKK’s cadres before any discussion on the state’s Kurdish policy could begin. Even 
though Demirel had stated in 1991 that he had finally realized the Kurdish reality in 
Turkey, he abrogated the reforms which were initiated by Ozal, and restricted the 
government’s contacts with the Iraqi Kurdish leadership. Demirel subscribed to the hard-
liners’ thinking that labelled reforms regarding the organization of the Kurdish 
community as unpatriotic.  
The PKK decided to resume fighting in June 1993. Meanwhile, Labor Party 
(Halkin Emek Partisi-HEP), Turkey’s Kurdish party was banned by a court, though its 
leading officials proceeded immediately to form a new one, the Democratic Party 
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(Demokrasi Partisi-DEP). The PKK focused on destabilizing Turkey’s tourist industry, a 
crucial source of revenue for the state, by staging bomb attacks against famous seaside 
resorts on the Aegean coast, and thus discouraging tourists from visiting the country.  
On October 18, 1993, the PKK warned all Turkish and foreign reporters to 
abandon “Northern Kurdistan.” In 1994, 300,000 troops massed in the southeast to fight 
against the PKK. The Turkish army’s campaign resulted in the devastation of numerous 
villages. In June 1994, the DEP was closed down, although a new Kurdish party, the 
People’s Democratic Party, or Halkin Demokrasi Partisi (HADEP), was formed. The 
Turkish offensive against the PKK continued unabated until Ocalan’s arrest in Kenya in 
February 1999. Having neutralized Ocalan, the Turks thought that the war was finally 
won.      
C.   U.S. POLICY AND TURKEY: STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP 
1.  Mutual U.S.-Turkish Interests 
In the 1980s, the strategic partnership between the United States and Turkey was 
still conditioned by the Cold War imperatives, and the fact that Turkey was considered a 
frontline state ensured minimal criticism of Turkey’s Kurdish policy. For example, 
during the U.S. State Department’s daily briefing on June 15, 1988, the spokesman 
confirmed that the United States still viewed the Kurdish question through a Cold War 
lens by stating that  
U.S. policy is that Kurds should satisfy their aspirations peacefully within 
the framework of the existing states. The United States does not interfere 
in the internal affairs of those countries.85 
When Robert Strausz-Hupe, the U.S. Ambassador in Ankara in the ’80s, was 
asked about the increasing incidents of human rights abuses against the Kurds, he said 
that he preferred to let the Europeans “carry the human rights ball.”86 Apparently, his job 
of keeping the Turks in line with the U.S. policies of Soviet containment was more 
important than wasting political capital in criticizing Turkey’s Kurdish policy. However, 
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there were also officials in the administration with quite “progressive” ideas, such as 
Richard Schifter, Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian 
Affairs, who noted in 1988 that “we believe that although they [the Kurds] are not 
included in the Lausanne Treaty, they are a national minority by international 
standards.”87 
In general, during the 1980s, U.S. officials avoided debates concerning Turkey’s 
Kurdish policy, choosing instead to emphasize improvements in the Turkish human rights 
regime, as recorded in the State Department's Country Report on Human Rights Practices 
for the years 1986, 1987 and 1988. However, the tone changed in 1989, as the report for 
that year noted that a large number of human rights abuses had taken place in Turkey and 
that "continuing instances of torture was the principal human rights problem in 1989." 88 
The report criticized the inaction of the country’s legal system concerning allegations of 
torture, and the fact that basic civic freedoms were curtailed. The 1989 report also noted 
serious restrictions that continued to exist on freedom of expression, association and 
assembly, and the state’s intolerance regarding the cultural rights of the Kurds.  
After the end of the Cold War, Turkey and the United States continued to have 
similar views on many strategic issues, including the accession of Eastern European 
countries to NATO, Turkey’s roadmap to the European Union, and the diversification of 
energy resources through the building of new oil pipelines that would transfer Caspian oil 
to the West by avoiding Russian or Iranian soil.89 During the 1990s, the United States 
continued to view Turkey as a pivotal state regarding the more activist U.S. role in 
Middle Eastern affairs. The proximity of Turkey to the Middle East meant that the 
country was still important to many U.S. foreign policy concerns.  
The close military cooperation between Turkey and Israel after 1996 also made 
Turkey’s role in Middle Eastern affairs seem more significant for Washington. During  
this same period, the end of the war in Bosnia presented an unexpected opportunity for 
                                                 
87 Michael M. Gunter, The Kurds in Turkey: A Political Dilemma (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990), 
117. 
88 “Turkey: Human Rights Developments,” Human Rights Watch, 
http://www.hrw.org/reports/1990/WR90/HELSINKI.BOU-04.htm (accessed February 9, 2008). 
89 Rubin and Kirisci, Turkey in World Politics, 132. 
 43
Turkey. Indeed, the United States asked Turkey, as a Muslim NATO country, to 
undertake the challenging task of training the Bosnian Muslim army, because prolonged 
U.S. involvement in the western Balkans could be full of political risks. Nevertheless, the 
Clinton administration started stressing the importance of respect for human rights and 
democratic governance at a time when Kurdish unrest in southeast Turkey was forcing 
the Turkish authorities to curtail civic freedoms and commit atrocities. That was highly 
inconvenient for Turkey’s profile internationally. 
2. Congressional Criticism of Turkey’s Kurdish Policy  
By the early/mid-1990s, Congressional criticism of Turkey’s human rights record 
had substantially grown. On November 26, 1991, Lee H. Hamilton, Chairman of the 
Committee on Foreign Affairs, sent a letter to Secretary of State James Baker regarding 
the violations of the human rights of Turkey’s Kurds, as reported by Helsinki Watch. In 
his reply on November 22, 1991, Secretary Baker argued that Helsinki Watch’s 
accusations of arbitrary use of force by Turkish security forces should not be viewed in a 
fragmentary way; instead, it should be examined in the context of the increasing number 
of terrorist assaults in that country. Baker went on to stress that Turkey is a secular 
country, and its constitution guarantees equality of all its citizens before the law, 
irrespective of their ethnic, religious, or racial backgrounds. Baker also was certain that 
there were no prohibitions whatsoever in Turkey regarding the public use of Kurdish or 
the publishing of journals in the Kurdish language.90 
In early 1994, Hamilton brought back the Kurdish question in Turkey in an 
exchange of letters with the State Department by asserting that a viable solution to  
Kurdish unrest had to take into account the political and social needs of the Kurds. Peter 
Tarnoff, Acting Secretary, answered that, in principle, the United States government 
agreed with Hamilton’s propositions, and thus continued to advise Turkey to seek 
political and social solutions to the Kurdish question, as opposed to a purely military 
settlement.91  
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The U.S. desire for a politico-social solution to the Kurdish puzzle, without any 
detailed analysis of what exactly a politico-social solution actually meant, had already 
been mentioned in a Voice of America (VOA) editorial, aired on June 18, 1993, which 
reflected the views of the United States government on the Kurdish question in Turkey. 
The VOA editorial pointed out that, when the Secretary of State met with President 
Demirel and other Turkish officials, he underlined the importance of improving the 
country’s human rights record and the treatment of its Kurdish minority. The editorial 
mentioned that the United States was satisfied by recent reforms undertaken by the 
Turkish government, which sought to strengthen the human rights regime in the country 
and grant the Kurds their cultural rights. The VOA voiced the opinion that  the long-term 
solution to the Kurdish question should be based on political and not solely military 
means.92 
But as the situation in southeast Turkey deteriorated, Congress became more 
sensitive to the plight of the Kurdish community. The Turkish Human Rights Compliance 
Act, which was introduced into Congress in March 1995, sought to deal with a wide 
range of issues of Turkish interest, such as reported human rights abuses, the Turkish 
blockade of humanitarian assistance to Armenia, Turkey’s unwillingness to seek a viable 
solution to the Cyprus question, the non-recognition of the existence of a Kurdish 
minority in Turkey, and the unabated harassment of the Turkish Christian minority. The 
legislators threatened to withhold $500,000 a day in U.S. assistance until Turkey took 
positive steps toward resolving all of the mentioned issues.  The Turkish Human Rights 
Compliance Act failed to attract a majority vote.93  
Also, the U.S. Congress exerted pressure on the White House to oppose the 
prospect of Istanbul holding the 1999 summit of the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), arguing that Turkey had no respect for human rights and 
the commands of international law. Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs 
Marc Grossman disagreed with the Congressional recommendations and insisted that the 
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Istanbul OSCE summit was a great opportunity to discuss human rights issues and 
democratic rule in a state that sought to meet the OSCE standards.94 
3. Rhetoric by State Department Officials 
In their dealings with the press, U.S. officials usually opined that constitutional 
reforms in Turkey were promising regarding its human rights record; however, 
throughout the 1990s, Turkey denied State Department officials or representatives of 
international non-governmental organizations free access to the Kurdish region. Data 
collected by the U.S. Embassy in Ankara concerning the Kurdish insurgency were rarely 
based on reports from those who had actually traveled across the area of interest.95 
Nevertheless, Richard Holbrooke, Assistant Secretary of State for European affairs, 
called Turkey a frontline state. In March 1995, Holbrooke stated that Turkey “stands at 
the crossroads of almost every issue of importance to the U.S. on the Eurasian 
continent.”96 
 During a visit to Turkey, the Assistant Secretary of State asserted that nobody 
could deny the importance of human rights; however, the rights issue should not cause a 
rift in U.S.-Turkish relations.97 Holbrooke’s pro-Turkish stance was backed in the 
summer of 1995 by General John M. Shalikashvili, chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, who argued that the Turkish army “was moving forward with new measures aimed 
at enhancing Turkish democracy and human rights.”98  
Assistant Secretary Holbrooke apparently followed the principles of realism in 
international relations regarding the importance of Turkey to America’s interests; 
however, there were other officials with quite different ideas. For example, when Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of State John Kornblum was asked in 1996 how destruction of 
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property in Turkey differed from that in Iraq, he said that “if you’re in a village, there’s 
no difference whatsoever.”99 In 1998, Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbot asserted 
that 
 the United States supports Turkey's right to defend itself against 
terrorists...But we also believe, as do many Turks, that there can be no 
solely military solution to the problems that continue to plague Turkey's 
southeast, and that any enduring answer to Turkey's Kurdish question will 
depend on the willingness of the Turkish government to safeguard the 
human rights of all the people of Turkey…countries which trample the 
rights of their citizens end up paying a price in terms of political viability 
and stability of the state itself. When the U.S. talks to its friends, it tries to 
be respectful of their sovereignty, yet also tries to couch the argument in 
terms of realpolitik, as well as what might be called moralpolitik.100 
Talbot believed that there could be no trade-offs between security and human 
rights concerns, because the persecution of the Kurdish minority in Turkey would 
eventually destabilize the country and undermine the strategic interests of the United 
States.101  
In spring 2000, after the arrest of Ocalan in Kenya, Talbot wrote that the recent 
developments made the prospect of a peaceful solution to the Kurdish issue more 
realistic. The Deputy Secretary of State argued that the fate of the PKK leader had made 
many Kurds realize that waging guerilla warfare against their own state could not 
possibly secure their basic rights, while the political establishment in Turkey now 
understood the futility of a solely military solution to Kurdish nationalism.102 
Indeed, Ocalan’s arrest led many officials in the U.S. administration to believe 
that this was a real opportunity for reconciliation between the Turkish state and its  
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Kurdish minority. Just a month after the arrest, Harold Koh, Assistant Secretary of State 
for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, stated before the Commission on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe that  
enduring solution lies in the expansion of democracy, including full 
democratic political participation by all Turkey’s citizens, and protection 
of their human rights…we continue to urge the Government of Turkey to 
make systemic changes….103  
Koh asserted that what the majority of the Kurds really wanted was freedom to 
live according to their own traditions and culture. Therefore, Koh argued that, if the 
Turks decided to grant the long-awaited cultural and linguistic rights to the Kurds, the 
Kurds “would have more of a stake in the country’s future.”104 
4. U.S. Support on the Operational Level 
Although the Kurdish uprising in southeast Turkey was virtually ignored by the 
U.S. media throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the U.S. military has been instrumental in 
supporting the Turkish fight against the PKK. An American corporal who was working 
for the U.S. Air Force on a Turkish military base revealed that American personnel 
processed intelligence concerning the Kurdish insurgency and provided data to the 
Turkish Military Police (TMP). The corporal went on saying that “we get names, 
locations, and other information on the enemy and the TMP breaks down the doors of the 
safe houses where the terrorists are hiding.”105 
When the Western forces left Iraq in the spring of 1991, they left teams of U.S., 
French, British, and Turkish officers at the Military Command Center (MCC) in the Iraqi 
town of Zakho, as a way to direct the activities of Operation Provide Comfort (OPC). 
Soon, security issues on both sides of the border line became intertwined as the United 
States and Turkey forced the Iraqi Kurds to support the fight against the PKK. The 1991 
Gulf War had “isolated” the Iraqi Kurds from Saddam’s repressive regime, but had also 
made Turkey’s leverage over their fate manifest. So, if the Iraqis rejected collaboration 
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with the Turks, necessary food and medical supplies could be delayed indefinitely on the 
Turkish borders. Moreover, the Iraqi Kurdish leadership relied on Turkey for visas to 
travel to Europe and the United States.  
The MCC proved instrumental in intelligence gathering against PKK’s operations 
in northern Iraq. Also, U.S. intelligence-gathering aircraft (AWACS), which operated in 
the area in the context of OPC, would have a Turkish intelligence officer on board who 
relayed relevant information to Turkish ground stations. U.S. fighter jets also provided 
information about PKK militants’ positions. A U.S. F-15 pilot admitted that there were 
cameras on his jet that frequently photographed the positions of PKK insurgents in the 
mountains.106 
Despite the valuable support of the U.S. armed forces against the Kurdish 
insurgency, there were many Turkish officers who suspected that the Americans were 
secretly assisting the PKK guerilla forces in Iraq. Indeed, in 1992, a Turkish General was 
reported warning the Americans that his forces would not hesitate to shoot down U.S. air 
assets if they were found within the theater of operations. According to General Richard 
Hawley, then-U.S. Commander of Operation Provide Comfort, the Turkish army claimed 
that ground markings in the form of a letter T, traditionally used by U.S. helicopters for 
landing, had been discovered in remote PKK camps in northern Iraq, leading the Turks to 
the conclusion that the Americans were actively supporting the PKK by evacuating its 
wounded fighters. General Hawley stressed that the Turkish allegations were totally 
unfounded, and he himself viewed the PKK as a terrorist group and an enemy of the 
United States.107  
The Turkish establishment’s suspicions vis-à-vis U.S. policies in Iraq derived 
from the famous “Sevres syndrome” which has haunted the Kemalists since the War of 
Turkish Independence. Despite numerous American assurances that the United States 
supported the territorial integrity of the Turkish Republic, many in the country’s political 
                                                 
106 McKiernan, The Kurds, 65. 
107 McKiernan, The Kurds, 82. 
 49
establishment doubted that this was Washington’s real agenda.108 The interest of the 
United States in the protection of the Iraqi Kurds and its resolve to launch Operation 
Provide Comfort led students in the Turkish War College to argue that  
the Allied forces exploit the ongoing Operation Provide Comfort, with the 
aim of carving out an autonomous zone for the Kurds of northern Iraq, an 
attempt that inevitably undermines Turkey’s territorial integrity, and 
eventually aims at dismembering the Turkish Republic.109 
Suspicion over U.S. secret strategic designs for Turkey increased even further 
when, in late 1998, Washington succeeded in reconciling the differences between Barzani 
and Talabani’s parties and brought an end to the Kurdish civil war that had devastated 
northern Iraq since the mid-1990s.  The two men signed an agreement whose references 
to a federal political system in Iraq forced Turkey to protest vigorously.110 
5. U.S. Support through Arms Sales  
Excessive arms sales to Turkey have also been considered tangible proof of U.S. 
support for the Turkish anti-PKK campaign. During his testimony before the 
Subcommittee on International Operations and Human Rights, House International 
Relations Committee, William Hartung, an analyst at the World Policy Institute, argued 
that from the mid 1980s to the mid 1990s, American companies sold Turkey $9.4 billion 
in weapons because of the Kurdish insurgency. In his words, it was “far and away the 
biggest use of weapons and most aggressive use anywhere in the world.”111 During the 
same period, the United States gave Turkey $5 billion in military assistance, part of 
which was used for arms purchases from U.S. companies.112 
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Kevin McKiernan has also revealed that U.S. arms were transferred to the Turkish 
army and then to southeast Turkey without any oversight by the Congress. Specifically, 
in 1992 and 1993 the Pentagon approved the shipment of considerable amounts of heavy 
weapons to Turkey under the provisions of a 1990 treaty which placed restrictions on the 
post-Cold War conventional forces in Europe. The shipment included over 1,509 tanks, 
54 fighter planes, and 28 attack helicopters to Turkey. There was never any 
Congressional debate on these arms transfers.113 Amnesty International exerted pressure 
on the Clinton administration to restrict arms sales to Turkey on the grounds of its poor 
human rights record; however, the administration rejected proposals to make arms sales 
dependant on human rights reports.114  
Nevertheless, in May 1994 the House Appropriations Committee proposed 
legislation which restricted the assistance funds available to Turkey, and also made 
twenty-five percent of the annual aid package dependant on verified improvements on 
Turkey’s human rights record. In July, a number of Senators proposed restrictions on the 
use of any American-made military equipment for internal security purposes. The 
Turkish government expressed its disappointment, and argued that the implementation of 
such restrictions would only benefit the terrorists and would deprive Ankara of the 
necessary means to fight against the insurgents.  
The Turkish reaction and Prime Minister Ciller’s personal appeal to President 
Clinton resulted in the lifting of the proposed restrictions concerning the internal use of 
U.S. military equipment. However, not all restrictions were lifted. Ultimately, the Foreign 
Operations Appropriations Act for fiscal year 1995 made ten percent of the principal 
amount of direct loans (Foreign Military Financing-FMF) for Turkey dependant on a 
report by the State Department that would evaluate the alleged human rights abuses in 
southeast Turkey and the role of U.S.-made equipment in those abuses.115 Turkey reacted 
by stating that it did not accept conditional aid packages, and therefore refused to claim 
the ten percent part of the aid. 
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 Directed by the Congress to investigate continuing reports that U.S.-made 
armament was extensively used against civilians in southeast Turkey, the State 
Department concluded its report in mid-1995 in cooperation with the Department of 
Defense. The State Department’s report reaffirmed the important role of Turkey in 
supporting Western interests in the Middle East, and stressed the traditional U.S.-Turkish 
friendship and close cooperation between the two countries in the context of NATO. 
Turkey was still regarded as a frontline country for the West despite the end of the Cold 
War. The report went on, highlighting the fact that Turkey was the only allied country 
that faced serious challenges concerning its territorial integrity, and that unhindered U.S. 
support to overcome these challenges was necessary. The Kurdistan Workers Party 
(PKK) was described as a brutal terrorist organization, supported by Syria, Iran, and 
some groups located in Europe, whose goals were Turkey’s dismemberment and the 
destabilization of the northern Middle East. The State Department acknowledged that the 
Turkish military operations against PKK’s separatism included the evacuation or 
destruction of many Kurdish villages, and had contributed to human rights abuses; 
therefore, “a more civil-based approach by the Turkish government is required to 
effectively address the problem in the southeast.”116 
 The report confirmed that Turkey had extensively used U.S.-made armament 
against the PKK, and possibly in support of operations concerning evacuation or 
destruction of villages.  However, the reporting officials found no tangible proof to verify 
allegations of torture or extrajudicial killings by Turkish security forces involving U.S. 
equipment. The State Department also argued that the primary aim of the PKK initially 
was the establishment of a Marxist-Leninist independent Kurdistan which would 
comprise twenty-two provinces in southeast Turkey, and later, the creation of "greater 
Kurdistan" by annexing the Kurdish-populated territories of Iraq, Syria and Iran. The 
report made clear that the United States opposed both PKK’s objectives and its terrorism.  
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D.  EUROPEAN POLICY AND TURKEY: THE RELATIONSHIP BECOMES 
COMPLEX 
1.  The Leverage of the European Parliament on E.U.’s Turkish Policy 
Throughout the 1980s, the imperatives of the ongoing Cold War kept Europe 
relatively silent regarding the outbreak of the new Kurdish insurgency and the harsh 
response of the Turkish state. However, in view of its decision to apply for full 
membership into the European Community in early 1987 (the Europeans had advised the 
Turks against it), Turkey initiated some reforms in order to make its application more 
attractive. In that context, in January 1987, Turkey accepted the right of its citizens to 
appeal to the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). That development allowed 
Turkey’s Kurds to seek redress through ECHR’s legal services for a number of issues, 
including destruction of property, forced resettlement, and other human rights abuses. 
Additionally, Prime Minister Ozal introduced a law into the GNA that put an end to the 
practice of internal exile. Nevertheless, the Turkish application was rejected in 1989, 
primarily on the grounds of structural weaknesses in the Turkish economy.    
At the same time, Kurdish activism started taking root in European capitals. One 
of its first manifestations occurred in October 1989, when the first international Kurdish 
conference took place in Paris. The conference was organized by the Paris-based Kurdish 
Institute, and was sponsored by a human rights organization founded by Danielle 
Mitterrand, spouse of the then-French President.117 Danielle Mitterrand was an ardent 
supporter of Kurdish aspirations and a friend of Kendal Nezan, a Kurdish physicist from 
Turkey, whom she had helped when he established the Kurdish Institute in Paris in 1982. 
It was Ms. Mitterrand who alerted her husband to the humanitarian disaster in northern 
Iraq in the spring of 1991 and induced him to demand coordinated action by United 
Nations forces and the Americans.118 
In the early 1990s, when the E.U. initiated the process of negotiations for the 
Turkish-E.U. customs union accord, the primary concern of the European officials was 
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that any deal with the Turks had to go through Athens. The Hellenic Republic, member 
of the E.U. since 1980, had traditionally used its leverage in the European establishment 
and its veto power as a way to force Turkish concessions on the Cyprus issue and their 
long-standing bilateral differences. But it was not only Athens that prevented the E.U. 
from building a positive relationship with Ankara. Berlin had its own reasons to block 
Turkey’s steps toward the E.U. in the 1990s. Indeed, preoccupation with the economic 
cost of German unification, and fears that Turkey’s membership in the E.U. would trigger 
a new flow of immigrants toward Europe, made Germany skeptical, if not hostile, about 
Turkey’s roadmap to Europe. 
E.U. officials had also pointed out from the beginning that the fragility of the 
Turkish democratic institutions would eventually emerge as a serious obstacle. Indeed, at 
the 1993 Copenhagen summit, the E.U. member states agreed on a set of criteria that any 
country wishing to join the European club should meet. According to the Copenhagen 
criteria, the new member states had to establish  
stable institutions that guaranteed democracy, the rule of law, human 
rights, and respect for the protection of minorities, the existence of a 
functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with 
competitive pressure and market forces within the Union.119 
Although the negotiating framework included reforms toward a more democratic 
rule, the situation of the Kurds and the fact that their different identity was denied by the 
state were not part of the agenda. It seemed that the Europeans were under the impression 
that issues such as the repression of the Kurdish minority and the improvement of 
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Kurdish problem was necessary.120 That arrangement accommodated Turkey’s strategy 
of continuing to refer to the Kurdish unrest solely as a question of terrorism and not one 
of minority status.121 
2. Europe’s Crackdown against the PKK: The German, Hellenic, and 
French Cases 
The situation in southeast Turkey came up again in June 1992, when the European 
Parliament (E.P.) adopted a resolution that declared the PKK a terrorist group and 
recognized Turkey’s right to defend its territorial integrity and the lives of its citizens.  
However, the European Members of Parliament (MPs) also deplored the overwhelming 
force used by the security agencies against the Kurdish insurgents. 
The German government had traditionally been more critical of Turkey’s Kurdish 
policy than the rest of the European countries. The Bundestag even imposed embargoes 
on military equipment sales to Turkey in 1992 and 1994, following reports that German-
made equipment was regularly used for razing Kurdish villages. Although concerns about 
human rights abuses played their part in shaping Germany’s policy vis-à-vis the Kurds, 
the presence of about 300,000 Turkish immigrants of Kurdish origin made Germany 
sensitive to the developments in southeast Turkey.122  
But in late 1993, the PKK was officially outlawed in Germany after a series of 
attacks against targets of Turkish interests which occurred in June and November 1993. 
The German Interior Minister stated that “Germany must not become a battlefield for 
foreign terrorists.”123 The German authorities also banned thirty-five Kurdish 
organizations that were affiliated with the PKK, while German police thoroughly 
investigated their offices and cultural centers. The German crackdown against the PKK 
resulted in numerous protestations by Kurdish immigrants throughout Germany. For 
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example, Kurds blockaded roads and clashed with German police in March 1994; in 
March 1995, Kurdish activists staged bomb attacks against Turkish interests in many 
German cities; in the summer of 1995, a hunger strike by 170 Kurds provoked clashes 
between demonstrators and German security forces. 
The unrest in the Kurdish community in Germany forced the government to send 
a delegation to Damascus in October 1995 in order to hold secret talks with Ocalan. The 
PKK leader said that he felt sorry that many Kurds had caused problems in Germany, but 
he noted that “a German Government that supports the Turkish Army and the secret 
service is, of course, a threat to us.” Ocalan argued that most of the bomb attacks in 
Germany were staged by the Turkish secret service. He added that he was disappointed 
that the German had failed to keep the promises they had made to him. He finally warned 
the German representatives that, if their government continued to attack the PKK’s 
organizations in Germany, “it might be faced with extreme Kurdish reaction.”124 
In France, two PKK-affiliated organizations were banned in late 1993. The 
Interior Minister stated that “these associations are the legal front of the PKK, which in 
France as in other European countries carries out terrorist or criminal actions which we 
cannot tolerate on our territory.”125 These developments led to an emergency meeting of 
the British, German, and Turkish Foreign Ministers in Ankara in January 1994. The 
British and German sides emphasized Turkey’s right to fight against activities which 
threatened its territorial integrity. However, the European Ministers warned Ankara that 
the elimination of the terrorist threat should not result in widespread human rights 
abuses.126 
Although Germany and France tried to forge a common E.U. front against the 
PKK, Greece opposed a joint E.U. resolution against the Kurdish organization. The 
government and the press in Greece had been sympathetic to the Kurdish cause since the 
mid-’80s due to the long-lasting Hellenic-Turkish enmity. Numerous Greek journalists 
had interviewed Ocalan and had spent days in PKK’s camps in the Bekaa valley. For its 
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part, the Hellenic government preferred to underline the human rights abuses against the 
Kurdish community and the lack of respect for the Kurds’ cultural rights,; however, 
Greece never expressed support for the PKK’s campaign or to its terrorist tactics.  
But Turkish agencies believed that Greece actively supported the PKK. The Turks 
asserted that, 1) Greek parliamentarians of the Socialist Party had visited Bekaa valley 
camps in 1988 in order to express their support to Ocalan, 2) the Greek Cypriots were 
harboring the PKK in southern Cyprus (700 PKK guerillas were based there in camps) 
and financing its operations, 3) the Greeks supplied the PKK with anti-tank missiles and 
other explosives, 4) the bomb attacks against Turkey’s tourist industry were orchestrated 
by PKK militants and retired officers of the Greek secret service, 5) the Greek 
government had placed a refugee camp close to the town of Lavrio at the PKK’s disposal, 
6) the Hellenic Ministry of Foreign Affairs had provided scholarships to thirty-three PKK 
members in Greek universities, 7) the Greek government had promised Ocalan that it 
would establish an Athens-based agency that would deal with arms transfers to the 
PKK.127 
3.  Late 1990s: Deterioration of Turkish-E.U. Relations   
In January 1995, the E.P. reacted to the imprisonment of Kurdish MPs by 
suspending its working relation with the Turkish Grand National Assembly (GNA), and 
urged the Turkish authorities to release the legislators. The proceedings of the Turkish-
E.U. Joint Parliamentary Commission came to a halt, which was a serious setback in the 
process of ratifying the Turkish-E.U. Customs Union agreement. The Turkish GNA 
implemented constitutional reforms in July that granted additional rights to the trade 
unions but failed to discuss European concerns about the Kurdish question.128 EU-
Turkish relations further deteriorated as a result of the Turkish military operation in 
northern Iraq in March 1995. The Foreign Ministers of Germany, France, and Spain, as 
representatives of the E.U., visited Ankara to discuss the deadlock on the Customs Union 
accord and Turkish intentions regarding the duration of the operations in Iraq. The 
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Turkish government assured its interlocutors that the military intervention would be 
short, and would exclusively focus on wiping out PKK camps. In that context, the 
Turkish Foreign Minister visited other European capitals in order to discuss his 
government’s intentions. According to Philip Robins, by 1995-1996, the Kurdish 
question had “clearly emerged as a visible and controversial factor in relations between 
the E.U. and Turkey in the 1990s.”129 
Although the European capitals were eager to accept Turkey’s assurances about 
the duration and purpose of the Iraqi operation, the E.P. criticized the Turkish activities in 
Iraq, urged the E.U. member states to impose a military embargo on Turkey, and finally, 
called for a political solution to the Kurdish unrest in Turkey. The European MPs also 
were critical of Article 8 of the 1991 Turkish anti-terror law, which penalized any written 
or verbal propaganda or any activity that threatened the indivisibility of the Republic. 
Nevertheless, in December 1995, pressure from European governments, along with some 
revisions in the Turkish anti-terror law, convinced the E.P. to ratify the Customs Union 
Pact by a margin of 343 votes to 149.130 Pauline Green, leader of the Socialist Group in 
the E.P., argued that many MPs voted in favor of the ratification only with “sorrow, with 
heavy hearts, and without enthusiasm.”131  
However, the ferocity of the Kurdish-Turkish conflict in 1996 triggered fresh 
criticism by the European MPs, who argued that “the political bases for the assent to the 
customs union had eroded.”132 The E.P. suspended the flow of aid funds to Turkey, with 
the exception of funds targeting the support of the democratization process in the 
southeast. Turkey’s Kurdish policy had other side effects, too. In April 1995, the 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe proposed that Turkey be expelled from  
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the Council if, within two months, it failed to bring its legal system in line with the values 
of the Council. The Assembly also called for the suspension of human rights abuses 
against the Kurdish minority. 
Such criticism from the Europeans, coupled with their continuous 
recommendations of a political solution to the Kurdish unrest, led the Turkish 
establishment and Turkish public opinion to infer that the European Union was favoring, 
if not sponsoring, the dismemberment of the country. Indeed, in a televised interview, 
President Demirel revealed that, during his talks with the French Foreign Minister Alain 
Juppe in March 1995, the French official pointed out that  
we believe that the [Kurdish] problem is not just a military one, at the 
same time it also has political characteristics…Among the public opinion 
of France, Germany, and Spain and other European countries, there are 
people who believe that PKK terrorists are struggling for the social and 
political rights of the Kurds.133  
President Demirel asserted that European calls for a political solution to the 
insurgency in the southeast actually meant the granting of autonomy to the “Kurdish” 
provinces, which in turn would lead to the destabilization of the whole country.  
There were other activities in European capitals, undertaken by Kurdish activists 
whose actions were not hindered by Europe’s liberal-democratic political culture, that 
outraged Turkey. Specifically, in March 1995, the state-controlled British Broadcasting 
Council allowed MED-TV, a pro-Kurdish satellite television station, to broadcast its 
program to Europe and the Middle East from London. In April of the same year, the 
Kurdish Parliament-in-Exile, which was, according to Turkish and U.S. agencies, a PKK-
financed propaganda body, convened in The Hague despite Turkey’s protests. Turkey 
reacted by recalling its Ambassador to the Netherlands and canceling arms purchases 
from Europe. This provided the Parliament-in-Exile with headlines in the major European 
journals, a development that Turkey certainly did not intend to provoke.  
But it was the events that followed Ocalan’s arrest in Kenya on February 17, 
1999, by Turkish Special Forces that shook the European public and boosted the 
internationalization of the insurgency in southeast Turkey. Specifically, after the scenes 
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of the PKK leader’s capture had been broadcasted around the world, hundreds of enraged 
Kurdish protesters stormed the Consulate of Israel in Berlin. Three protesters were killed 
by the guards. Similar incidents took place in other German cities, and also in Britain, 
France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Austria, Denmark, Sweden, and Italy, where Kurds 
attacked the Greek and Kenyan Consulates. There were some cases where the protesters 
occupied the consulates for days, keeping their personnel hostage.134 The trial of Ocalan 
and the suspension of the PKK’s activities were welcomed by the European capitals. 
However, the majority of European political analysts were hardly assured that the war 
against Kurdish nationalism in Turkey was over.  
4. The Kurdish Diaspora in Europe  
It was the 1990s when the Kurdish Diaspora decided to pursue the 
Europeanization of the Kurdish question in Turkey and Iraq, since neither country 
seemed receptive to ideas of democratic rule and respect of human rights. Supported by 
numerous international human rights organizations, the Diaspora lobbied the E.U. 
institutions in order to force them to become more involved in the Kurdish conflict, and 
to place the issue of human rights norms at the top of E.U.-Turkish negotiations. The 
Diaspora’s campaign coincided with the strengthening of the human rights regime in 
Europe, and the increased sensibility of center-left governments - most governing 
coalitions in E.U. countries were led by center-left parties throughout the ’90s - toward 
human rights abuses. 
E.U. expert John McCormick argued that, in the early 1990s, there were 
approximately 3000 interest groups based in Brussels whose role was to lobby the 
European Commission or the E.P. and influence E.U. policies.135  The Kurdish Diaspora 
understood the complexity of the decision-making process in the European establishment, 
and knew that it could influence decisions only if it would function within the system. In 
that context, the Diaspora, along with the Hellenic and Cypriot interest groups, took some  
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credit for the drafting of the E.U.’s 1997 enlargement policy - the so-called Agenda 2000 
- which excluded Turkey from the first group of countries that would receive accession 
invitations.  
Kurdish unrest in Turkey and the reported human rights abuses were obviously 
convenient excuses for placing Turkey, along with Romania and Bulgaria, in a future, 
second wave of enlargement. But although Romania and Bulgaria became full E.U. 
members in January 2007, Turkey was still at the very beginning of the negotiating 
process in early 2008. Nevertheless, Turkey’s exclusion from the first round of 
enlargement disappointed the Turkish elites, and prompted the hardliners to argue that the 
EU, just like the United States, was in favor of an independent Kurdish state.  
E.  CONCLUSION 
Jonathan Randal has argued that the State Department never formulated an 
official policy that both encompassed all the Kurdish communities in the Middle East and 
took into account the large demographic size of the Kurdish people. Instead, it has always 
considered them as “downtrodden, occasionally troublesome minorities.”136 
The imperatives of the Cold War prevented U.S. criticism of Turkey’s Kurdish 
policies in the 1980s. The Republican administration in Washington and the center-
rightist governments in Europe at that time were not really concerned about human rights 
as an important parameter of foreign policy decisions. But in the ’90s, attitudes in the 
United States and Europe were quite different. The Clinton administration placed human 
rights and protection of minorities at the top of its foreign policy agenda. The democratic 
peace theory had been brought to prominence in Washington.  
In Europe, landslide victories of center-leftist parties removed most of the 
conservative governing coalitions, and the European human rights regime entered a 
period of regeneration. The Maastricht Treaty of 1991, the Copenhagen criteria of 1993, 
the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, which entered into 
force on February 1, 1998, and the advanced role of the E.P. brought human rights to the 
top of the E.U.’s agenda. 
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Turkey understood that ignoring the human rights concerns of Europe and the 
Congress was no longer an option. The absence of a powerful Turkish lobby in the 
United States, in conjunction with the traditional influence of Armenian and Hellenic 
interest groups on Congress, was another reason for the Turks to be concerned. So certain 
reforms, even superficial ones, had to be implemented in order to convince Turkey’s 
American and European interlocutors that the rule of law was Turkey’s sole yardstick of 
its policy toward its citizens of Kurdish origin. Katerina Dalacoura has argued that 
Turkey’s reform package of 1995 seemed quite important to the Europeans, but the 
reform movement faded when the attention of the international community shifted to 
other developments in the world. The Turks thought that the announcement of impressive 
reforms, without actually implementing them, would be enough to satisfy the human 
rights concerns of the United States and Europe.137 
On the other hand, the size of the Turkish economy, the geo-strategic importance 
of Turkey’s location in conjunction with the growing engagement of the U.S. in the 
Middle East, and prospects of lucrative arms deals to meet the needs of the Turkish army 
meant that Europe and the United States could not afford to marginalize Turkey solely on 
the grounds of its poor human rights record. Apodaca and Stohl talk about the 
contradictions between rhetoric and practice in U.S. foreign aid policy. They argue that 
human rights do play a role in the decision of who receives U.S. bilateral 
foreign assistance, and how much they are allotted. But other national 
security interests play a more prominent role. Countries perceived to be of 
vital importance to U.S. national security…receive aid regardless of their 
human rights records.138 
In that context, Europe sought a carrot-and-stick policy that would keep Turkey 
on the periphery while it facilitated the gradual improvement of its human rights record 
and its treatment of the Kurdish community there. However, Europe’s inability to decide 
whether Turkey’s accession to the E.U. was vital to European interests, and the endless 
debate about whether Turkey culturally belonged to Europe, made Turkey skeptical of  
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Europe’s agenda. As the prospect of a swift process of accession to the E.U. became 
blurred in the late 1990s, European pressure on Turkey to improve its human rights lost 
its dynamic. 
In the United States, the rhetoric of State Department officials also vacillated 
between two different attitudes. On the one hand was Holbrooke’s realist perspective, 
with its full support of Turkey and its de-emphasis on the importance of human rights 
principles, based on U.S. strategic interests in the wider area. On the other hand was the 
liberal perspective of Talbot, characterized by greater emphasis on democracy, and 
critical of Turkey’s poor human rights record and its inability to safeguard the cultural 














IV.  THE TURKISH KURDISH QUESTION AFTER THE EARLY 
2000S  
A.  INTRODUCTION 
The arrest of the PKK leader in 1999 and his renunciation of armed resistance 
against the Turkish state led the group’s cadre to suspend its guerilla operations. Some of 
the militants turned themselves in, while others decided to leave Turkey and seek refuge 
in northern Iraq. As life in the southeast started gradually to return to normal, the Turkish 
establishment focused on the country’s European perspective.   
This chapter shows that Turkey’s concessions to the Kurdish community in the 
2000s were moderate and piecemeal and certainly did not undermine the unitary 
character of society. Turkey, motivated by the prospect of full E.U. membership, 
implemented an array of reforms, some of which challenged old notions of Kemalist 
nationalism. The European establishment embarked upon a strategy of intense 
socialization with Turkish elites in order to make the Turks understand what norms were 
either acceptable or unacceptable to the E.U., and what structural reforms Turkey had to 
make in order to join the European club. Moreover, the official Turkish-E.U. accession 
talks made clear that Europe understood Turkey’s Kurdish question as an issue of denied 
cultural rights, as opposed to intentional forced assimilation of an ethnic group.  
As far as Turkish-U.S. relations were concerned, after the 2003 tensions, the 
research in this chapter reveals that both countries soon realized the importance of a 
strong bilateral relationship. Despite its initial skepticism, the United States supported 
Turkey’s military operations in Iraqi Kurdistan against PKK positions in February 2008. 
The Bush administration realized that Turkish patience with the PKK’s attacks from its 
Iraqi safe haven had been exhausted, and failure to provide credible assistance on the 
PKK front could seriously destabilize the U.S.-Turkish relations.  Although the academic 
community had long estimated that a massive Turkish operation in northern Iraq would 
cause a rift in Turkish-U.S. and Iraqi Kurds-U.S. relations, nothing of that sort happened. 
This chapter’s analysis of the U.S.-Turkish relations in the 2000s demonstrates that,  
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despite U.S. rhetoric concerning human rights and the treatment of the Kurds, the United 
States, in line with the rationalists’ approach, kept viewing Turkish-U.S. strategic 
partnership as vital to America’s interests.  
B.   TURKISH DOMESTIC POLITICS: THE POLICY OF CONCESSIONS 
1. Recognition of the “Kurdish Reality”  
In late 2002, Turkey lifted the state of emergency over the last two Kurdish 
provinces in the southeast.139 The GNA enacted the Reintegration Law in July 2003 
which offered amnesty for some of the Kurdish combatants. Specifically, PKK militants 
who were eager to surrender to state authorities and provide information on PKK camp 
locations or the whereabouts of Kurdish leaders still at large were granted reduced 
sentences. Only those PKK members who had not taken part in armed attacks were 
eligible for full amnesty. Although the law was supposed to stay in force for a limited 
period of six months, the Turkish authorities insisted that it nevertheless was quite 
successful. However, the establishment failed to mention that the majority of those who 
sought to take advantage of the law were prisoners as opposed to active militants.140 
 Meanwhile, the gradual normalization of life in the southeast brought the issue of 
internally displaced persons to the fore. Kurdish groups and non-governmental 
organizations in Turkey often argue that the conflict in the southeast has led to the 
displacement of over three million Kurds. These organizations have accused the Turkish 
state of actively hindering the return of the Kurdish villagers in various ways, most 
important of which is the maintenance of the institution of village guards. More than 
50,000 guards were still employed by the state in late 2004, while the arbitrary conduct of 
their duties and their strong opposition to the return of the displaced persons remained a 
source of friction in the Kurdish countryside.         
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Meanwhile, constitutional reforms in mid-2003 permitted Turkish citizens to 
speak, broadcast, and receive education in “local dialects.” Although the authorities were 
slow in implementing the provisions of the new regulations, many private tuition centers 
in Istanbul and the southeast were granted permission to include Kurdish language 
courses in their curriculum. On 9 June 2003, Our Cultural Riches, the first ever program 
in Kurmanji, was broadcast by the National Turkish Television. Within a week, a similar 
program was aired in Zaza. A cultural earthquake had shaken the foundations of Kemalist 
Turkey.141  
However, considerable restrictions remained. The maximum duration of broadcast 
Kurdish programs on radio and television are 60 and 45 minutes per day respectively. 
They may only contain news and traditional music but no films. Local stations cannot 
broadcast Kurdish programs without permission from the National Institute of Statistics. 
The Institute is supposed to examine their audience ratings before they can receive 
authorization to broadcast, a procedure which has been widely used to delay the 
launching of local Kurdish television stations. As far as the teaching of Kurdish is 
concerned, courses may only last for ten weeks.142 
The token concessions of the Turkish government to its Kurdish community did 
not significantly alter the “deep state’s” view of the pro-Kurdish political parties, which 
were still viewed as carriers of political extremism. In March 2003, the Constitutional 
Court banned the pro-Kurdish People’s Democracy Party (HADEP) on charges of 
providing support to the PKK. Tens of HADEP’s leading members also received a five 
year prohibition from participating in politics. 
Along with the careful steps of the state vis-à-vis the cultural rights of the Kurds, 
the political establishment made regular references to the Kurds’ secondary identity. 
Former President Ahmet Sezer often commented about the secondary identity of the 
Kurds, arguing that “the Turkish state has no problem with secondary identities of the 
people in Turkey. After all, in the view of the state secondary identities constitute the 
                                                 
141 Chris Morris, The New Turkey: The Quiet Revolution on the Edge of Europe (London: Granta 
Books, 2005), 105. 
142 Yildiz, The Kurds in Turkey, 70. 
 66
riches of our country.”143 In 1999, Sezer, as the head of the Turkish Constitutional Court, 
criticized the undemocratic nature of the country’s constitution. He argued that freedom 
of speech was not secure in Turkey, as “crimes of thought” abounded. Surprisingly, Sezer 
also criticized the state’s restrictions on the use of the Kurdish language.144 In line with 
the former President’s rhetoric, Prime Minister Erdogan has also offered that  
in this country we have such ethnic elements as Kurds, Lazes, Caucasians, 
Georgians, and Albanians. These are secondary identities. We have one 
single primary identity; that is the citizenship of Turkish Republic…In 
Turkey, Kurd is married to Turk…they have all become like flesh and 
nail….145 
2.  The Turkish-PKK Clash Resumes 
The relaxation of the cultural restrictions on the Kurdish community did not 
satisfy the PKK, now known as the People’s Congress of Kurdistan (Kongra-Gel), whose 
leadership stated on June 1, 2004, that unless the state granted full amnesty to the 
Kurdish militants, PKK operations would resume. Turkey had no intention of negotiating 
with Ocalan’s successors; thus, fighting resumed in the southeast. 
In April 2007, General Buyukanit, chief of the Turkish General Staff, described 
the strategy of the army against the resurgent PKK. The general argued that Turkey’s 
anti-PKK policy would be successful only if the military and civilian leadership were 
united and determined to conduct the anti-terror operations, and they focused on 
neutralizing the external sources of support to the Kurdish group. General Buyukanit 
stressed that Turkey should launch a psychological offensive and wipe out the PKK’s 
self-confidence.146  
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On October, 18, 2007, the GNA authorized the Turkish government to launch 
military attack against the PKK’s camps in Iraq whenever that was deemed necessary. 
Turkey had already massed about 100,000 troops along the Turkish-Iraqi border, 
supported by strike helicopters and tanks. On November, 28, 2007, Prime Minister 
Erdogan stated that the Council of Ministers had authorized the Turkish army to launch 
its offensive in northern Iraq; however, he refrained from clarifying whether the 
intervention would be immediate.147 Indeed, the cross-border operation was launched on 
February 21, 2008 and lasted for a period of less than two weeks.    
C.   U.S. POLICY AND TURKEY: THE STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP IN 
TURMOIL, AND THE U.S. – IRAQI KURDS ALLIANCE 
1. Coolness and Rapprochement after the 2003 Iraq War  
In the State Department’s 2000 Annual Report, Turkey was commended for its 
successes in combating terrorism, along with Algeria and Spain. From Ankara, U.S. 
Ambassador Robert Pearson argued that Turkey was the U.S.’s best friend and ally in its 
struggle to eradicate terrorist groups throughout the world. The ambassador added that 
the experience of the Turkish army in fighting Kurdish insurgents in the southeast should 
be utilized by the U.S. authorities.148  
However, although both Turkey and the United States continued to share mutual 
interests in the post-Cold War era, the solid base of bilateral cooperation against the 
Soviet threat had ceased to exist; therefore, U.S.-Turkish relations had become more 
unstable and unpredictable. The uncertainties of the cooperation framework were 
pronounced after the 9/11 attacks. While Turkey, like most of the European countries, 
was alarmed by the growing unilateralism of the United States, it nevertheless supported 
Washington’s military intervention in Afghanistan by providing ground forces to back 
the Karzai regime. But when the Americans signaled their determination to bring about 
regime change in Baghdad, the Turkish government, led by Bulent Ecevit until the 
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autumn of 2002 and Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) after that 
November’s elections, expressed their reservations regarding U.S. designs in Iraq.149  
The refusal of the Turkish Parliament in March 2003 to authorize the deployment 
of U.S forces on Turkish soil in order to open a northern front against Iraq disappointed 
the Bush administration and plunged the bilateral relations into turmoil. Turkish concerns 
about the U.S intervention in Iraq were based on the view that the territorial 
disintegration of Iraq along ethnic / sectarian lines had to be prevented at all costs.  
Turkey feared that the war in Iraq could cause a power vacuum in northern Iraq, 
which would be used as a safe haven by the PKK to wage attacks against the Turkish 
authorities. Additionally, the Turks feared that a possible partition of Iraq would result in 
the establishment of an independent Kurdish entity to the north. Ankara suspected that 
such an entity could serve as a model for Turkish Kurdish separatists.150 Moreover, the 
Turks were concerned about the safety of the Iraqi Turkmen, their ethnic kin, who are 
mainly concentrated at the Kurdish north.151 Turkey’s refusal to cooperate with the 
United States on the eve of the 2003 Iraqi war deprived Ankara of its ability to influence 
developments in post-war Iraq. Furthermore, U.S.-Turkish relations received a new blow 
when U.S. forces apprehended eleven Turkish commandos in Iraqi Sulaimaniya on July 
4, 2003, accusing them of plotting against the regional government of Kurdistan.152  
Although U.S.-Turkish relations suffered after Turkey’s unwillingness to support 
the U.S. operations in Iraq, both sides soon signaled their determination to sustain their 
long-standing links. The AKP government, in addition to its desire to maintain a working 
relationship with the United States, also suspected that its political enemies could use the 
deterioration of the bilateral relations as a way to undermine its future and credibility. In 
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that context, the Erdogan administration, contrary to the widespread anti-Americanism of 
Turkish public opinion, sought to restore the U.S.-Turkish bond. This policy was 
exemplified by frequent high-level visits to Washington.  
On the other hand, the Bush administration, after its initial disenchantment with 
the Turkish non-cooperation strategy, weighed up the advantages of strong U.S.-Turkish 
relations and reached the conclusion that the normalization of bilateral relations would 
serve U.S. interests such as the unhindered function of U.S. military bases on Turkish 
soil.153 The “rapprochement” was clearly demonstrated by the document entitled “Shared 
Vision and Structured Dialogue to Advance the Turkish-American Strategic Partnership,” 
presented by then-Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul and Secretary of State Rice in 
Washington in July 2006. The purpose of the document was to extend the basis and tools 
of bilateral cooperation. The two sides decided that the areas of cooperation should be 
widened and that the bilateral dialogue should include not only military officers and 
members of the executive branch, but also businessmen, media, civil society, scientists 
and academicians. The document also underlined the determination of the two countries 
to counter terrorism, “including the fight against the PKK and its affiliates….”154 
2. The Resurgent PKK Pushes Turkey to Intervene in Iraq 
 The build up of Turkish military forces along the border with Iraq during the 
summer of 2006 and again in June 2007 signaled Turkey’s impatience with the PKK 
presence in Iraqi Kurdistan. The 2006 build up was addressed by the United States 
through the appointment of retired General Joseph Ralston as Special Envoy for 
countering the PKK. His mission was to coordinate with the Turkish and Iraqi authorities 
in order to eradicate the PKK challenge.155 The 2007 Turkish military build up 
demonstrated the Turkish view that the Ralston initiative had failed to eliminate the 
PKK’s terrorist threat. Ralston resigned in mid-2007.  
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 In order to prevent a Turkish invasion in late 2007, President Bush was reported 
to have authorized a covert, joint U.S-Turkish operation, aiming to neutralize the PKK in 
Iraq and behead its leadership. The Bush administration believed that the U.S role in this 
venture could be concealed, and in any case would be denied. The willingness of the 
Bush administration to engage U.S forces in a risky operation that could endanger the 
country’s alliance with the Kurdistan Regional Government revealed Turkey’s ability to 
use its armed forces as an effective tool of foreign policy and its willingness to challenge 
U.S arrangements in Iraq.    
 On November 5, 2007, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and deputy 
chief of military staff General Ergin Saygun met President Bush in Washington to discuss 
the developments in northern Iraq, including the threat by the resurgent PKK. Half a 
month before the visit, on October 22, PKK militants who were based in Iraqi Kurdistan 
had attacked and killed twelve Turkish soldiers. This particular PKK attack received wide 
media coverage and triggered a new public dialogue regarding the situation in the 
southeast.  
Since 2003, due to its opposition to the U.S. intervention in Iraq, Turkey had been 
deprived of the option of cross-border operations within Iraqi territory in order to 
suppress fresh Kurdish activism. For nearly four years, the PKK, protected in the 
northern Iraqi safe haven and ignored by the United States army due to the insurgency in 
Arab Iraq, managed to re-establish itself, organize its forces and resources, and plan a 
new campaign against the Turkish state. Furthermore, the Iraqi Kurds were now 
unwilling to tolerate Turkish operations on their soil or provide any other assistance 
against the PKK.  
Until PKK activism in the southeast reached a climax in October 2007, 
Washington advised Ankara to show self-restraint and launched initiatives, such as the 
Ralston mediation, which all proved fruitless. The United States was clearly not prepared 
to put the Iraqi Kurds’ support at risk. However, as the death toll rose in southeastern 




threat from Iraqi Kurdistan came to be seen in Turkey as the root cause of the PKK’s new 
campaign. A 2007 Pew Center poll indicated that only nine percent of Turks had a 
positive view of the United States.156  
The U.S. government concluded that it was time to change its policy vis-à-vis 
Turkey and Iraqi Kurdistan when Turkish public opinion led the AKP government to 
seek GNA authorization for cross-border military intervention against the PKK. The 
Bush administration also concluded that, unless Washington actively addressed Turkish 
concerns over the PKK issue, the anti-American sentiments in Turkey would further 
intensify; thus, the working relationship with the AKP government and the continuation 
of the use of the Incirlik air base could be put at risk. Concluding his November meeting 
with the U.S. President, Erdogan stated that he had “obtained what he wanted.” He also 
added, to the astonishment of the journalists, that he had asked Bush to “choose between 
Turkey and [Kurdish leader Massoud] Barzani.”157 During the meeting, President Bush 
was reported to have promised advanced intelligence sharing against the Kurdish group. 
Despite the negative polls, the two sides continued their contacts at the highest 
level. On January 8, 2008, Turkish President Abdullah Gul visited President Bush in 
Washington. The meeting was supposed to demonstrate the importance of close Turkish-
American relations and the fact that U.S policy re-orientation, publicized during the 
November Bush-Erdogan meeting, was ushering the bilateral relations into a new era. 
Bush did not hesitate to identify the PKK as a “common enemy” and promise “actionable 
intelligence” to the Turks, a development that was seen by the press on both sides of the 
Atlantic as the “green light” for a limited military intervention in northern Iraq by the 
Turkish army. Bush also repeated that the United States strongly supported the Turkish 
roadmap to the E.U. by referring to Turkey as “a constructive bridge between Europe and 
the Islamic world.”158 
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 U.S. officials revealed that, during the Bush-Gul meeting, the American President 
mentioned that the solution to the PKK threat could not be just military; rather, the 
solution should address political, social, and economic grievances in the southeast. Gul 
dismissed Bush’s comments by arguing that Turkey did not need external advice on how 
to deal with Kurdish terrorism.159 
 The Turkish cross-border operation was launched on February 21, 2008. Visiting 
Ankara on February 27, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates stated that the duration of the 
operation should not exceed the timeframe of a week or two. Secretary Gates noted that 
military action alone could not solve the problem of terrorism in Turkey; he added that 
“security operations should always be accompanied by political and economic initiatives. 
A long-term solution is possible only if Turkey addresses the Kurds’ grievances.”160 
Meanwhile, a day before, the White House representative had mentioned that the United 
States hoped that the Turkish operation would be short, would focus on the PKK forces, 
and that there would be no civilian casualties. The White House noted that Ankara’s 
motives were well understood.161 
D. EUROPEAN POLICY AND TURKEY: THE FIRST STEPS TOWARD 
FULL E.U. MEMBERSHIP, AND THE EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS 
REGIME 
 When the prospect of E.U. membership became real in the early 2000s, the reform 
of the constitutional provisions regarding human and minority rights was brought to the 
top of the political agenda in Turkey. Since the end of 2001, the GNA adopted eleven 
“E.U. Harmonization Packages” which introduced new legislation or amended existing 
regulations. For example, the second package of March 2002 lifted the ban on publishing 
in a language prohibited by law; the package of August 2002 abolished restrictions on the 
right to learn and broadcast in “languages and dialects traditionally used by Turkish 
citizens;” the package of June 2003 did away with restrictions on selecting names for the 
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children; the constitutional amendment package of May 2004 made sure that the 
provisions of international law on fundamental rights and freedoms would take 
precedence over contradictory national laws.162 In total, 490 laws were introduced or 
amended by the GNA until late 2007.    
The necessary reforms that Turkey had to implement in order to fulfill the 
Copenhagen criteria and harmonize its legislation with E.U. norms were indicated in the 
European Commission’s Accession Partnership document of March 2001. Its short-term 
goals focused on constitutional guarantees of important civic rights, including freedom of 
expression, freedom of association, prohibition of torture, abolition of the death penalty, 
reform of the Turkish legal code in accordance with the European Convention on Human 
Rights, and removal of all kinds of language restrictions in learning and broadcasting. 
Turkey was supposed to reach the short-term goals by the end of 2001; however, most of 
the reforms were implemented no sooner than the end of 2004.  
The Turkish government was expected to reach the medium-term goals of the 
Accession Partnership within the following years, but had to signal its political 
determination to introduce such reforms during 2001. The medium-term reforms included 
the ratification of important international human rights conventions and treaties, the 
recognition of people’s right to cultural diversity, and the abolition of the state of 
emergency in the Kurdish provinces. As an initial step to reform Turkey’s civil-military 
relations along European/western lines, the National Security Council’s role should be 
reduced to a solely advisory one. 
The Accession Partnership document triggered an intense political discussion in 
Turkey. Senkal Atasagun, head of Turkey’s National Intelligence Service, argued that the 
execution of Ocalan would hardly serve the Turkish interests. He also stated that the time 
had come to allow television broadcasts in Kurdish which would be controlled by the 
state. While Prime Minister Ecevit publicly supported Atasagun’s comments, it was the 
National Movement Party, a partner in the governing coalition, that rejected the logic of 
concessions to the Kurds. Reflecting the views of the armed forces, its leader argued that 
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“it is impossible for Turkey to look favorably upon ‘cultural’ and ‘ethnic rights’ which 
will only serve to fan the flames of ethnic conflict and discrimination….”163     
Nevertheless, on October 6, 2004, the European Commission stated that Turkey’s 
progress was substantial and that the country had met the criteria of initiating accession 
negotiations. In that context, on December 17, 2004, the heads of member states decided 
that the long process of Turkish-E.U. negotiations would start in October 2005. However, 
the Commission’s 2004 report on Turkey failed to make direct references to the Kurdish 
question. Instead, the Kurdish issue was linked to known human rights violations; thus, 
the report made clear that, as far as the E.U. was concerned, the Kurdish question was an 
issue of human rights, as opposed to a matter of minority status and forced assimilation. 
The E.U. decision to initiate accession negotiations with Turkey caused 
aftershocks in the French and German political scenes. In France, then-President Chirac 
was obliged to declare that France would choose to ratify the Turkish-E.U. accession 
treaty through a popular referendum. In Germany, then-Chancellor Schroeder was 
criticized for the uncritical support he offered to the Turks. Angela Merkel’s conservative 
party stated that a privileged partnership between the E.U. and Turkey was more 
appropriate, rather than full membership.164 
1. The European Parliament and Turkey 
There were always profound differences of style in the Commission’s and the 
European Parliament’s treatment of the Turkish candidacy. While the Commission’s 
reports were more vague and politically correct, the Parliament’s language vis-à-vis 
Turkey was more direct and specific. For example, in March 2004, the Parliament’s 
Committee on Foreign Affairs and Human Rights urged the Turkish authorities to embark 
upon a campaign of reforms that would guarantee the cultural rights of its people, 
broadcasts in languages other than Turkish, and the socio-economic development of the 
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southeast. The committee added that all these reforms were crucial for the prosperity and 
progress of the Kurdish community in Turkey.165 
Apart from its bureaucratic approach to the Turkish candidacy, the European 
Parliament sponsored various forums where the significance of the Turkish roadmap to 
the E.U. on the Kurdish question was addressed. For example, on September 19 and 20, 
2005, the European Parliament organized a conference in Brussels under the title “The 
E.U., Turkey, and Kurds.” The panelists argued that the treatment of Turkey’s Kurdish 
community was expected to play a decisive role in the country’s endeavor to join the 
European institution. Hatap Dicle, one of the panelists, a Kurd and former member of the 
Turkish parliament who had received a fifteen year prison sentence in 1994, stated that 
the prospect of Turkey’s accession to the E.U. was welcomed by the Kurds. Dicle added 
that Turkey’s E.U. membership was not a given, but would depend on the progress of the 
reforms. However, he accused the Turkish authorities of conducting a new “campaign of 
violence and murder in Kurdish areas” since 2004.166 
The European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI), established 
by the Council of Europe as an independent mechanism for monitoring the performance 
of its member states on human rights, has also been critical of Turkey’s human rights 
practices. In its third report, adopted in June 2004, the ECRI noted that Turkey had made 
significant progress on the protection of human rights by ratifying the International 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination in September 2002, 
and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and 
the UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (UNCCPR) in September 2003. However, 
Turkey expressed a reservation regarding Article 27 of the UNCCPR, declaring that its 
provisions will be interpreted and applied in Turkey in line with Turkey’s constitution 
                                                 
165 Arie M. Oostlander, “Report on the 2003 Regular Report of the Commission on Turkey’s Progress 
towards Accession,” Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security and Defense Policy 
(2004) 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sidesSearch/search.do?type=REPORT&language=EN&term=5&author=12
82# (accessed April, 1, 2008). 
166 Ahto Lobjakas, “Turkey: EU Conference Highlights Continued Repression of Kurds,” 
RadioFreeEurope http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2005/09/97618727-009f-4ac3-8449-
d062f5d982e7.html (accessed January, 25 2008). 
 76
and the Treaty of Lausanne.167 The reservation was widely regarded as a juristic effort by 
Turkey to satisfy the international community while keeping its policies towards the 
Kurdish community virtually unchanged. Another reservation on Article 13 of the 
ICESCR restricted the freedom of parents to educate their children according to their own 
beliefs and the freedom of citizens or groups to set up educational centers under specific 
conditions.  
The ECRI criticized the fact that Turkey had not yet signed or ratified the 
UNESCO Convention against Discrimination in Education, the European Charter for 
Regional or Minority Languages, the Framework Convention for the Protection of 
National Minorities, and the European Convention on Nationality.168 
2. The Negotiating Framework and the First Progress Report   
During the first half of 2005, the European Commission drafted the Turkish-E.U. 
negotiating framework. As far as minority and human rights in Turkey are concerned, the 
negotiating framework provided that  
the Union expects Turkey to … work towards further improvement in the 
respect of the principles of liberty, democracy, the rule of law and respect 
for human rights and fundamental freedoms…the implementation of 
provisions relating to freedom of expression, freedom of religion…and 
minority rights…The progress will be measured in particular against the 
following requirements…the stability of institutions guaranteeing 
democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of 
minorities….169 
In that context, the European Commission published its first report concerning 
Turkey’s progress in incorporating the Union’s norms in late 2006. The report noted that 
Turkey had made some progress in the realm of human rights law by ratifying the second 
optional protocol to the UNCCPR and Protocol No. 13 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR), both referring to the abolishment of the death penalty. Turkey 
                                                 
167 “Third Report on Turkey,” European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (2004) 
http://www.coe.int/t/e/human_rights/ecri/1-ecri/2-country-by-
country_approach/turkey/Turkey%20third%20report%20-%20cri05-5.pdf (accessed May 19, 2007). 
168 “Third Report on Turkey,” European Commission against Racism and Intolerance. 
169 “Negotiating Framework,” http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/st20002_05_TR_framedoc_en.pdf, 
(accessed April 28, 2007). 
 77
had still not ratified Protocol No. 12 of the ECHR concerning the general prohibition of 
discrimination by state authorities. The country’s record on minority rights was quite 
disappointing. In particular, Turkey continued to deny the existence of national minorities 
within its borders. The report implied that there were groups in Turkey that could meet 
the international/European criteria of a minority, and criticized the lack of official 
dialogue between Ankara and the High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) 
on the protection of minorities. It was suggested that the agenda of such a dialogue 
should include the education of minorities, public broadcasting in minority languages, 
and issues of political representation.170  
 The report also noted the Commission’s concerns on the issue of internally 
displaced persons (IDP), mainly from the Kurdish-populated southeast part of the 
country, and the lack of progress to put into action the “Return to Village and 
Rehabilitation Program”. The large number of land mines in the southeast, the limited 
funds provided by the government, the administrative barriers under the guise of security 
concerns, and the existing institution of village guards were some of the obstacles that 
discouraged displaced Kurds from returning to their villages. 
As to Turkey’s concerns over the threat posed by an autonomous Kurdish entity 
in northern Iraq, the Commission seemed to understand the Turkish anxieties. In that 
context, its representative stated in mid-2007 that the European Commission did not 
support the establishment of an independent Kurdish state in northern Iraq. The 
spokesman of the Turkish Foreign Ministry said that “we are of course in a position to 
take official statements by the representative of the European Commission seriously.”171  
The supportive stance of the Commission toward the AKP government in its clash 
with the “deep state” (derin devlet)  over the presidency, and its lukewarm reaction to the 
threat of a cross-border operation in northern Iraq in the second half of 2007, encouraged 
Prime Minister Erdogan in early 2008 to criticize European states for continuing to 
support the PKK. While delivering a speech at a security affairs conference in Munich, 
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Erdogan argued that the PKK was still active in many European countries under various 
names. He also asserted that, in just one country, the Kurdish organization had managed 
to raise five million Euros in a year. Erdogan said that European countries used to let 
Kurdish terrorists go free without any justification. 
E. CONCLUSION 
 Since the early 2000s, Turkey embarked on an ambitious project of reforms in 
order to convince its European interlocutors to authorize the initiation of E.U.-Turkish 
accession talks.  The evidence in this chapter demonstrated that the prospect of E.U. 
membership acted as a catalyst. As the reports from European institutions indicate, 
Turkey has recently ratified a number of international conventions that are viewed as 
critical to the protection of the Kurdish identity. Europe’s socializing strategy convinced 
the Turkish elites that substantial reform in the country’s human rights regime was the 
only way to curb the European Parliament’s skepticism regarding the Turkish candidacy.  
Indeed, important reforms of Turkey’s legal and judiciary systems, and some 
cultural concessions to the Kurds, permitted the initiation of the E.U.-Turkish talks. 
However, it is still too early to talk about the Europeanization of the Turkish elites; it is 
premature to infer that these reforms signal profound changes in the Turkish leadership’s 
political thinking. The Turkish reservations on Article 27 of the UNCCPR suggest that 
Ankara is still reluctant to recognize the existence of a Kurdish minority that deserves 
special rights. Turkey perceives itself as the cornerstone of European security, and a 
major regional power that deserves to talk to and negotiate with Europe on an equal basis. 
Therefore, extreme requests regarding Turkey’s roadmap to the E.U. have proved 
counter-productive, as they caused resentment and invariably assisted the conservative 
forces (Kemalists) in accusing the Europeans of promoting a secret agenda for the 
disintegration of Turkey. 
The research in this chapter revealed that the Europeans have reached the 
conclusion that the Kurdish question in Turkey can be solved through human rights 
reforms. All the official documents related to the E.U.-Turkish accession talks reveal that 
alignment of Turkey’s minority protection regime with Europe’s norms and regulations, 
the so-called acquis, is a precondition for full membership. References to autonomy or 
 79
other forms of self-administration for the Kurds are nowhere to be found in the official 
E.U.-Turkish correspondence. Actually, the Kurdish question is not a distinct subject of 
the bilateral talks; rather, it is indirectly dealt with through the general provisions of the 
section concerning human rights. In that sense, it is not far-fetched to argue that 
documented Turkish practices of forced assimilation and cultural repression against the 
Kurds have been written off, if not legitimized, by the E.U.’s policy.  
The post-2003 turmoil in U.S.-Turkish relations brought to the Iraqi Kurds the 
unprecedented chance to ally themselves with the only superpower in the world. Under 
U.S. protection, Iraqi Kurdistan gained the status of a de facto autonomous entity and 
became the living emblem of Kurdish freedom. Meanwhile, Turkey was no longer free to 
conduct cross-border operations in order to keep the PKK in check. This development 
permitted the PKK cadre to safely re-organize itself, re-arm and train its militants, and to 
pose new threats to Turkish authority in southeastern Anatolia after late 2004.  
The Turkish establishment soon reached the conclusion that the root cause of the 
PKK’s resurgence was no other than the American occupation in Iraq, which had turned 
the Iraqi north into a safe haven. U.S. calls for self-restraint and advanced Iraqi-Turkish 
cooperation in order to eradicate PKK terrorism gradually lost their appeal as the death 
toll in Turkish Kurdistan started rising. When it became obvious that the Turks had 
exhausted their patience, the United States agreed to actively support the Turkish 
operation in northern Iraq through intelligence sharing. The Turkish determination to 
intervene in American-occupied Iraq made clear to both Europeans and Americans that 
Turkey is in a position to conduct an independent foreign policy and to protect its vital 
interests. Clearly, territorial integrity takes precedence over other important interests, 
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V. CONCLUSION 
A.  THE KEMALISTS AND THE KURDS IN TURKEY 
Huntington has argued that Turkey - traditionally denying its place in the Middle 
East, and left out of the core of the European establishment - might choose to pursue the 
dream of a pan-Turkic world. He has asserted that if Turkey fails join the European club 
under its own terms, it may “resume its much more impressive and elevated historical 
role as the principal Islamic interlocutor and antagonist of the West.”172 In recent years, 
the traditional Kemalists, best represented by Turkey’s conservative party and the 
military, have lost a considerable number of political battles, as Erdogan’s “moderate” 
Islamists have secured a second term in government and elected a leading AKP member 
as President. However, the Islamists continue to adopt important Kemalist notions, 
including Turkey’s orientation toward Europe and its unwillingness to recognize the 
Kurds’ otherness. The Kemalists are not yet ready to sing their swan-song, and far-
fetched concessions to the Kurds could undermine the Islamists’ hold on power.  
Kemalism may be under assault in contemporary Turkey, but some of its 
principles, such as nationalism and statism, are still relevant. Beginning in the 1920s, the 
Kemalists embarked on a project of total separation of religion and state and the forging 
of a unitary society that rejected people’s loyalty to diverse ethnic roots. The 
disintegration of the Ottoman Empire, in the aftermath of World War I, and the clauses of 
the hated Sevres Treaty, the so-called “Sevres syndrome,” led to the violent suppression 
of early Kurdish nationalism by the Kemalists. In fact, the Kemalist regime sought to 
assimilate its Kurdish minority and eliminate any trace of its cultural heritage.  
Even today, Kemalist conservatism views European and U.S. pressures to grant 
cultural, political, and linguistic rights to the Kurds as a prelude to a conspiracy against 
Turkey’s territorial integrity. Proposals from other domestic actors regarding concessions 
to the Kurds are also rejected as dangerous to the state’s unity. The Kemalists’ resistance 
to external pressures seems to be in line with the principles of the neo-realist theory in 
                                                 
172 Fouad Ajami, “The Clash,” The New York Times Book Review, January 6, 2008. 
 82
international relations. As discussed in the introduction of this thesis, the neo-realists 
argue that state interests and preferences derive from objective conditions and the 
material characteristics of a state. National interests may change according to changes in 
these conditions and characteristics. Domestic actors agree to socialization processes only 
when there are benefits, such as promises of rewards for compliance with norms, or 
threats of sanctions in response to deviations from normative standards. The actors being 
socialized agree to change their behavior to conform to international norms to the extent 
that the benefits of compliance are greater than the costs of resistance.  
The Kemalists have invariably followed this line of thinking. In the early 1980s, 
Turkey’s military, as the primary proponent of Kemalism, proclaimed itself the guardian 
of Turkey’s Kemalist heritage, introduced a new constitution which restricted political 
activism, and made itself the supervisor of the country’s orientation through the elevation 
of the National Security Council to the position of most powerful political institution. The 
ensuing standstill in European-Turkish relations was not of primary concern, as vital 
national interests, such as the country’s political stability, were at stake. However, later in 
the 1980s, the need for economic integration with Europe led the Turkish establishment 
to seek closer relations with the E.C.  
In the early 1990s, the military viewed President Ozal’s initiative to seek some 
kind of compromise with the Kurds with increasing alarm, but his death soon led to the 
military taking hold of the situation in the southeast. Later that decade, when Prime 
Minister Ciller examined the advantages and disadvantages of the Basque model 
regarding the administration of the Kurdish southeast, the military leaders made clear that 
they were better equipped to handle such an important issue. In the 2000s, the benefits of 
full E.U. membership led to reforms in the country’s human rights regime, but were 
moderate and did not challenge the unitary character of the state.  
The Turkish establishment has consistently rejected advice to negotiate with the 
Kurds. Calls for the initiation of a democratic dialogue on the Kurdish question are 
refused on the grounds that the unrest is led only by terrorists; thus, a democratic state 
never negotiates with terrorists. Undoubtedly, the ruthless tactics of the PKK, which 
adopted terrorism as a convenient means to overcome the superiority of the Turkish 
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army, caused widespread resentment in Turkey, even among the Kurds in the southeast. 
Ocalan’s heavy-handed practices led the Americans and, later, the Europeans, to 
denounce his group and its agenda. Even though the PKK had made a decisive 
contribution to the internationalization of the Kurdish question in Turkey, the Marxist-
Leninist outlook of the group and its violence turned key actors of the international 
community against it. Under such circumstances, the PKK had little chance of succeeding 
in establishing an autonomous or independent entity in southeastern Anatolia. 
In general, the Turkish state has been successful in dividing the Kurdish 
nationalist movement, either through co-optation or excessive repression. The 
concessions of the state toward the Kurds regarding television broadcasts, the private 
teaching of Kurdish, and the ratification of international treaties concerning human rights 
norms are important; however, they should not lead to the conclusion that Turkey is 
ready to grant excessive minority rights to the Kurds or let them freely debate their ethnic 
aspirations in public. Turkey’s preoccupation with the developments in Iraqi Kurdistan 
indicates that political freedom for Turkey’s Kurds is not on the agenda.   
 Finally, it is worth noting that there is no single opinion within the academic 
community regarding the role of Kemalism in dictating the fate of Turkey’s Kurds. Metin 
Heper has argued that the state never sought to forcefully assimilate the Kurds, even 
during the serious uprisings of the 1920s and 1930s, because Turkey’s leaders believed 
that since Ottoman times, a merging of cultures had taken place as a result of prolonged 
contact between Kurds and Turks (acculturation). Heper has asserted that when the first 
Kurdish rebellions took place, the state decided to abandon its centuries-old policy of 
recognizing the Kurds’ otherness. Instead, the state adopted a policy of not recognizing 
the Kurds’ distinct ethnic roots, with the aim of reversing the course of cultural 
separation. Heper supports his argument by mentioning that denial and non-recognition 
are two different notions; denial means that empirical facts are rejected, while non-
recognition means that empirical facts are not denied, but are tacitly concealed. What 
many academics term the forced assimilation of the Kurds is actually a non-recognition 
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of their otherness, which reflects the state’s effort to prevent the split between two 
cultures that have been united since ancient times. 173  
Heper’s view is indeed interesting as it seeks to defend Kemalism’s nation-
building effort and describe Turkey’s Kurdish policy through the lens of supposed 
acculturation. The fact that the Kemalists acknowledged the distinct ethnic roots of the 
Kurds is verified by their plans to grant limited autonomy to the Kurds in the early 1920s, 
which are credibly documented. However, even if what Heper asserts regarding the 
difference between denial and non-recognition is true, he fails to explain why the Turks 
are in a better position to judge what is best for the Kurds and their fate as a distinct 
ethnic group. Even though he admits that Kemalism understands the distinct roots of the 
Kurds, he insists that they can make progress in their lives only if they adopt Turkish as 
their primary ethnic identity and leave their Kurdish identity in their private domain.     
B.  THE UNITED STATES AND THE KURDS IN TURKEY   
The United States was involved in affairs in the Middle East even before the start 
of World War II. Primary sources have documented the creation of a strategic partnership 
between Turkey and U.S. based on the imperatives of the Cold War and the doctrine of 
Soviet containment. Turkey was labeled by the Americans as a frontline state whose 
contribution to the surveillance of any activity in the Soviet Union was indispensable. In 
that context, the United States chose not to criticize Turley’s Kurdish policy in the 1980s, 
especially when the successes of Ocalan’s group started to pose questions regarding the 
authority of the state in southeastern Anatolia. The Kurdish minority in Turkey was 
regarded as a potential tool in the hands of the Soviets, if and when they decided to 
destabilize the Turkish regime.  
After the end of the Cold War, in the 1990s, the United States started paying more 
attention to existing human rights practices, even among its allies. The focus of the U.S. 
administration on the spread of democracy in the world and the strengthening of the 
international human rights regime brought tension to U.S.-Turkish relations on many 
occasions, as State Department reports criticized Turkey’s human rights record and 
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clearly mentioned the Kurdish problem. Simultaneously, the culmination of the bloody 
clashes in the southeast came under intense scrutiny by international organizations, 
whose reports about the harsh treatment of the Kurdish population embarrassed the 
Turkish establishment. Also, the determination of some members of the U.S. Congress to 
expose Turkey’s poor human rights record and its lack of respect toward its Kurdish 
minority, and their desire to limit Turkey’s U.S. aid packages, caused further tension in 
bilateral relations. However, at no point did the U.S. administration express its favor 
toward schemes of autonomy or independence for Turkey’s Kurds. Instead, the U.S. kept 
stressing the importance of maintaining the territorial integrity of Turkey, though the 
Turks were advised to seek a solution that would not be solely military, but would 
address the political and cultural grievance of the Kurds.  
Although the Kurdish problem in Turkey made its appearance in official U.S. 
circles, the press kept ignoring it. Noam Chomsky has noted that, in the 1990s, there were 
only a few reports and some op-eds by representatives of international human rights 
organizations. The climate changed in 2003 after Turkey’s rejection of American requests 
to permit the transit of U.S. forces through Turkish soil in order to establish a northern 
front in Iraq. Chomsky mentions that the Boston Globe and the New York Times suddenly 
started publishing a plethora of articles regarding the appalling persecution of the Kurdish 
community by the Turks.174 
The change in U.S. attitude in the 1990s toward the Kurdish question in Turkey is 
important because Turkey realized that harsh suppression of Kurdish nationalism and the 
strategy of non-recognition of the Kurdish identity could not further stand international 
scrutiny. The 1990s were a completely different era, where defense of minority and 
human rights mattered and the Kemalist practices of the 1930s could not be tolerated any 
longer. The rhetoric of U.S. officials, contradictory as it was sometimes, convinced the 
Turkish leadership that some reforms had to be implemented in order to satisfy the 
sensitivities of its allied partners. 
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The primacy of Turkey’s strategic value to American interests over human rights 
concerns regarding the Kurdish minority, according to the rationalist approach in 
international relations theory, is best exemplified by the decision of the Bush 
administration in 2007-2008 to support Turkish cross-border operations in Iraqi 
Kurdistan, as long as they would be limited in time, focused on the PKK’s camps and 
manpower, and would cause minimal collateral damage to the civilian population. The 
U.S. administration realized that Turkish patience with the PKK’s raids from its Iraqi 
bases had been exhausted, and American failure to provide credible assistance on the 
PKK front could destabilize its working relationship with the Turks. Contrary to the 
estimations of the international press and the academic community, the United States 
supported Turkey’s limited cross-border operation of February 2008, without seriously 
harming U.S. relations with the Iraqi Kurds. 
C.  EUROPE AND THE KURDS IN TURKEY    
There are no great differences between the ways the United States and Europe 
have approached the Kurdish question in Turkey. Until the fall of the Berlin wall, 
Turkey’s Kurdish policy never really attracted the attention of the European states or the 
European Community (E.C.). In the E.C-Turkish negotiations of the 1960s concerning 
Turkey’s accession as an Associate Member, the Kurdish question and other human 
rights concerns were not on the agenda. Instead, the Europeans were primarily interested 
in the economic terms of the pact, with the issue of immigration flows from Turkey 
toward the European labor market being the most important of all. 
By the 1990s, Europe had changed. Turkey’s relations with the E.C. (now known 
as the European Union, or E.U.) were complicated by a determination on the part of E.U. 
members to deepen their cooperation, best exemplified by the decision to move the 
monetary union project forward, the rise to power of center-left governments in the 
majority of the member-states, the desire to make an adherence to European human rights 
norms a precondition for future members, and the European Parliament’s growing 
criticism of the treatment of the Kurds. 
When the prospect of full E.U. membership became real in late 1999, Turkey 
decided to implement extensive reforms in the fields of human rights, civic freedoms, and 
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the legal system, in order to initiate the accession negotiations. The E.U. embarked on a 
process of intense socialization with Turkish elites, best exemplified by the joint Turkish-
E.U. parliamentary groups and the Commission’s special teams which undertook the task of 
screening Turkish laws and regulations in various realms. The socialization was intended to 
make the Turks understand what norms were acceptable or not to the Europeans, and what 
short- and medium-term goals Turkey had to achieve. Socialization was also intended to 
explain the way civil-military relations in Turkey had to be revamped, so that the military 
would be brought under the democratic control of the civilian authorities (according to the 
western model).  
In that context, the E.U. believed that the gradual reform of the human rights regime 
and the legal code in Turkey would ultimately bring profound changes in the way various 
minorities, especially the Kurds, were treated. The Europeans also believed that the 
consolidation of democracy in Turkey would alleviate traditional Kurdish grievances and 
would progressively marginalize radical Kurdish groups.  
The Kurdish question is generally treated as a human rights problem, as opposed to 
an issue of forced assimilation and denial of the Kurds’ otherness. E.U. representatives, just 
like many U.S. officials, have occasionally advised the Turks that the solution to the unrest in 
the southeast cannot be solely military, but has to be one that addresses the cultural 
grievances of the Kurds and guarantees political representation of their community in the 
state administration. The banning of Kurdish political parties, based on arbitrary charges 
regarding affiliation with terrorism and national security, compromises Turkey’s image and 
undermines its European ambitions.  
There is validity in the E.U.’s strategy. The consolidation of democracy in Turkey, 
the revamping of civil-military relations which will restrict the traditional power of the 
military in dictating state policies, and the recognition of the Kurds’ otherness through the 
granting of their cultural and linguistic rights, can forge a new relationship between Turks 
and Kurds. However, the E.U. has to make it clear that there is a light at the end of the tunnel 
for Turkey. The long-lasting debate in Europe about whether Turkey has a place in the 
European establishment has to end soon. Otherwise, the E.U. will lose its credibility and 
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